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Recusal and the Supreme Court
DEBRA LYN BASSETr*
INTRODUCTION
It is an all too human trait to believe oneself fair and unbiased.
Indeed, to the degree that one possesses strong opinions, one tends to
rationalize them as objectively justified. In law, especially under the
adversary system, the potential for bias is anticipated and protections
provided. Clients are expected to focus on their own interests, and
lawyers are expected to represent those individualized client interests.
Balance is anticipated through the expectation that both sides will retain
counsel to vigorously represent their interests. While the parties are
expected to approach legal issues from their own individualized, even
selfish, perspectives, the ethical rules impose few obligations on attorneys
toward third parties or toward the justice system.' As a result, the system
places a particular burden on the judges-an impartial judicial "referee"
is essential to produce an appropriately "just" result.' Moreover, we
require not only that judges conduct themselves without actual bias
toward the parties, but also that judges are viewed, both by the critical
participants and third-party observers, as unbiased-in other words, they
must avoid even the appearance of impropriety.3
* Loula Fuller and Dan Myers Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. J.D.
1987, University of California, Davis; M.S. 1982, San Diego State University; B.A. 1977, University of
Vermont. I appreciate the helpful comments of Rex Perschbacher, Nat Stern, and Mike Lawrence on
an earlier draft of this Article.
I. See Debra Lyn Bassett, Redefining the "Public" Profession, 36 RUrGERS L.J. (forthcoming
2005); see also DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 57
(2000) (noting that under the ethical rules, "the rights and autonomy of third parties barely figure");
Deborah L. Rhode, The Future of the Legal Profession: Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 665, 668 (994) ("Although lawyers have certain obligations as officers of the court, these are
quite limited and largely track the prohibitions on criminal and fraudulent conduct that govern all
participants in the legal process.").
2. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHIcs § 9.OI, at 231 (3d
ed. 2004) (noting that "[a]n impartial judge is an essential component of an adversary system,
providing a necessary counterpoise to partisan advocates"); see also infra notes 21-25 and
accompanying text (discussing the importance of judicial impartiality to due process).
3. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 2, 3, 4 (2002) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]; see
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Of course, judges are human beings too and thus are not free from
bias. Again, the potential for bias is anticipated and protections provided.
Judges must disclose information that might be relevant to determining
their potential bias in a case.4  The concepts of recusal and
disqualification recognize that judges will, from time to time, have biases,
prejudices, or interests that prevent truly unbiased decision-making-or
that at least suggest some potential for bias. Avoiding the appearance of
impropriety requires a judge to withdraw from a case when the judge's
impartiality in a matter might reasonably be questioned. Thus, actual
bias is not required; the fact that the public might reasonably question a
judge's impartiality is sufficient to require the judge to withdraw from the
case. It is this concept of withdrawing from further participation in a case
that underlies the concept of judicial recusal.'
In recent years, a number of highly publicized cases have resulted in
collective head-shaking by the public and academics alike. The seeming
inconsistencies between what the applicable rules appear to require,
versus judges' behavior in actual cases, have led many to wonder whether
it is they-or the judges-who do not fully understand the notion of
judicial recusal.
One highly publicized instance of recusal in the Supreme Court-or,
more specifically, the failure to recuse - occurred in early 2004. The
situation involved allegations that United States Supreme Court
Associate Justice Antonin Scalia went duck hunting with Vice President
also John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 237, 238
(1987) ("Courts declare that impartiality is so important that a reasonable -albeit incorrect-
appearance of bias compels recusal .... ").
4. See MODEL CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 3E(I) cmt. 2 ("A judge should disclose on the
record information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might consider relevant to the
question of disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no real basis for disqualification.");
Richard Carelli, Judges' Financial Reports Hit Web, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 22, 2000, available at 2000
WL 23358974 ("Since 1979, federal judges ... have been required by federal law to report all stock
holdings and other family assets within broad ranges of estimated worth. They also must report gifts
and other reimbursements."); see also Ethics in Government Act §§ 101-109, 5 U.S.C. app. 4 (2000)
(requiring federal judges to file annual financial statements, and providing that such statements shall
be available for public inspection).
5. Traditionally "recusal" has referred to a judge's discretionary, voluntary decision to step
down. See RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
§ t.i, at 4 (1996) (noting this traditional view); Karen Nelson Moore, Appellate Review of Judicial
Disqualification Decisions in the Federal Courts, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 830 n.3 (1984) (noting that
although the term "recusal" often is used as a synonym for disqu-alification, "it technically refers to a
voluntary decision of the judge to step down"). "Disqualification," in contrast, refers to a motion for
the statutorily or constitutionally mandated removal of a judge. FLAMM, supra, § s.i, at 4-5. Despite
the technical distinction between "recusal" and "disqualification," they often are treated as synonyms.
[ln many jurisdictions the term "disqualification" has been defined in such a way as to
include both removal by a judge on his own motion and removal at the request of a party. In
fact, in modern practice the terms "disqualification" and "recusal" are frequently viewed as
synonymous and are often used interchangeably.
Id. § I.I, at 5.
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Dick Cheney when a lawsuit against Cheney was pending before the
Supreme Court.6 As Professor Lubet has explained:
Shortly after his inauguration, President George W. Bush named [Vice
President Dick] Cheney to head the National Energy Policy
Development Group (NEPDG), a task force charged with devising a
national energy policy.
Cheney's group worked in secret, without releasing interim reports
or revealing the names of participants at its meetings. That would be
legal only if all of the participants were government employees, but it
was widely suspected that some of the meetings included energy
company lobbyists and executives, including Enron's Kenneth Lay.
Two public interest groups-the Sierra Club and Judicial Watch-
sued for access to Cheney's records. [On July 8, 2003,] a lower court
ruled against the vice president, requiring him to disclose certain
documents. Noting that he could face a contempt of court citation if he
failed to comply, Cheney asked the Supreme Court to accept the case
for review.
... On Dec. 15, [2003,j the Supreme Court accepted the case and
scheduled it for hearing.
On January 5, 2004, Justice Scalia went duck hunting with Cheney
under circumstances that caused a loud-and sustained-outcry.8 In a
written response to the Los Angeles Times after the hunting incident first
attracted media attention, Justice Scalia denied any impropriety, stating,
"I do not think my impartiality could reasonably be questioned."9 Justice
6. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Justice Who Came to Dinner, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. I, 2004, § 4, at I.
7. Steven Lubet, Was Cheney Aiming for More than Ducks?, STAR TR. (Minneapolis, MN),
Feb. 3, 2004, at 15A.
8. See, e.g., Michael Janofsky, Scalia's Trip with Cheney Raises Questions of Impartiality, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 6, 2004, at A14; Charles Lane, High Court Questioned on Allowing Scalia Trip, WASH.
POST, Jan. 23, 2004, at Ao4; Dana Milbank, Scalia Joined Cheney on Flight; Justice's Ride on Air Force
Two Adds New Element to Conflict Issue, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2004, at Ao4; David G. Savage, 2
Democrats Criticize Scalia's Refusal to Quit Cheney Case, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2004, at A26; David G.
Savage, Senators Inquire of Justices' Recusal Rules; A Letter Questions Scalia's Impartiality on a Case
Involving Cheney After the Two Took a Trip, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2004, at Aio [hereinafter Savage,
Senators Inquire of Justices' Recusal Rules]; David G. Savage, Trip with Cheney Puts Ethics Spotlight
on Scalia; Friends Hunt Ducks Together, Even as the Justice is Set to Hear the Vice President's Case,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2004, at AI; Cheney, Scalia Hunt While Case is Pending, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Jan. 18, 2004, at 6A; House Democrats Call for Hearings on High Court Conflicts of Interest, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 20o4, at A14.
9. Savage, Senators Inquire of Justices' Recusal Rules, supra note 8, at 26A. Justice Scalia
subsequently defended his refusal to recuse himself by characterizing the pending case as "a
government issue" rather than a personal lawsuit "against Dick Cheney as a private individual." See
David Von Drehle, Scalia Rejects Pleas for Recusal in Cheney Case, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2004, at A35
(Justice Scalia was quoted as saying, "It did not involve a lawsuit against Dick Cheney as a private
individual .... This was a government issue. It's acceptable practice to socialize with executive branch
officials when there are not personal claims against them. That's all I'm going to say for now. Quack,
quack."). Still later, in response to a formal recusal motion, Justice Scalia again defended his continued
participation in the case in a memorandum opinion. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 124 S. Ct. 1391, 1393
(2004) (mem.) (Scalia, J.) (denying recusal motion). The Supreme Court decided the case three
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Scalia's decision to participate in the case was unreviewable. As Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist subsequently noted, "[T]here is no formal
procedure for court review of the frecusal] decision of a justice in an
individual case. This is because it has long been settled that each justice
must decide such a question for himself."'
In light of the publicity accompanying recent cases, and seeming
differences of opinion as to the circumstances under which judges are
required to recuse themselves from a case, the subject of judicial recusal
warrants additional scrutiny. Recusal issues arise at each level of both the
federal and state judiciaries: in the trial level courts, the intermediate
level appellate courts, and the court of last resort for the federal or that
state's system. This Article, however, will focus on the particularly
difficult and troubling issue of recusal in the United States Supreme
Court."
Part I of this Article examines the existence of unconscious bias, and
analyzes the important, but largely neglected, role of such bias in the
context of judicial recusal.'2 Part II examines the various provisions
relevant to the recusal of federal judges generally.'3 Part III analyzes the
particular problems of recusal at the Supreme Court level." Part IV
proposes modifications to the Supreme Court's recusal practices that
more directly acknowledge the Court's political nature, including, in
most cases, additional disclosures in the form of "statements of interest"
rather than actual disqualification."
months later, and Justice Scalia participated in the decision. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 124 S. Ct.
2576 (2oo4).
to. William Rehnquist, Let Individual Justice Make Call on Recusal, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan. 29,
2004, at 15A. Supreme Court Justices have been embroiled in recusal controversies on a number of
occasions. See Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Appellate Courts, 87 IOWA L.
REV. 1213, 1217 n.16 (2002) (citing examples); see also infra note 28 (same).
is. In a recent article, I undertook an examination of judicial recusal and disqualification in the
federal courts of appeals, observing that these issues in "the federal courts of appeals have largely
been overlooked." Bassett, supra note io, at 122o. As I noted, the scholarly legal commentary
discussing judicial disqualification has tended to focus on the federal district courts. See id. at 1220 n.28
(citing examples). This Article now undertakes the examination of the Supreme Court Justices that I
expressly reserved in my prior article. See id. at 1221 n.32 ("Although many of the concerns addressed
in this Article would apply to Justices of the United States Supreme Court, the nine-member Court
poses special recusal and disqualification concerns in terms of the limited number of Justices, the lack
of any provision for sitting by designation, and the reality that the Supreme Court is the court of last
resort without any option for further review.... Accordingly, issues concerning the recusal of Justices
of the United States Supreme Court are beyond the scope of this Article.").
12. See infra notes 16-74 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 75-13o and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 131-173 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 174-184 and accompanying text.
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I. RECUSAL AND THE GOAL OF IMPARTIALITY
Federal judges-whether at the district court, circuit court, or
Supreme Court level-take an oath of impartiality before performing
any judicial duties, swearing (or affirming) to "administer justice without
respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and
[to] ... faithfully and impartially discharge and perform [his or her] ...
duties."' 6 This notion of an "impartial arbiter" is central to both our
system of justice and our sense of justice.
Bias, of course, may affect a judge's ability to be impartial. In a
general sense, "bias" means an "[i]nclination; bent; prepossession; a
preconceived opinion; a predisposition to decide a cause or an issue in a
certain way, which does not leave the mind perfectly open to conviction.
To incline to one side... ,,1" In the context of judicial decision-making,
bias can arise in a number of circumstances. For example, financial bias
may exist if the judge has a financial interest in a party or the outcome of
the litigation. Relationship bias may exist if the judge is related to, or is
friends with, someone involved in the lawsuit.'9 Personal bias may exist if
the judge personally favors or disfavors someone involved in the
lawsuit. 0 All of these types of bias have the potential to impair the
judiciary's impartiality.
The avoidance of bias is more than a mere nicety; the avoidance of
bias is a prerequisite to due process. "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a
basic requirement of due process.... To this end no man can be a judge
in his own case and no man is permitted to try cases where he has an
interest in the outcome."'" Recusal aims to ensure both actual judicial
impartiality and the appearance of judicial impartiality, which are
necessary to ensure due process." The procedural protections provided
by evidentiary and other rules23 are of little value if a judge has an
interest in the outcome, or if a judicial participant favors or disfavors one
of the litigants.' Moreover, the necessity of judicial impartiality
16. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2000); see infra note 59 (quoting the oath in full).
17. BLACK's LAW DICrIONARY 147 (5th ed. 1979).
i8. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (2000).
19. See id. § 455(b)(5)-
20. See id. § 455(b)(I).
21. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (955).
22. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821-22 (1986) (indicating that an impartial
tribunal is required for due process); see also Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980);
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46-47 (1975); Ward v. Viii. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972);
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (927); Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory
Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 476 (1986).
23. Evidence excluded for lack of personal knowledge or as hearsay, for example, ultimately may
yield little protection if the judge harbors bias against a party. See FED. R. Evio. 602, 802.
24. See FLAMM, supra note 5, § 5.4.2, at i51 (noting that "permitting disqualification on
appearance grounds is reassurance not merely of the public but of the litigants themselves").
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encompasses both actual and perceived biases. As the Supreme Court
itself has noted, "even if there is no showing of actual bias in the
tribunal,.., due process is denied by circumstances that create the
likelihood or the appearance of bias."2"
Avoiding bias is also necessary to ensure public confidence in the
courts." As one commentator has observed:
Judicial decisions rendered under circumstances suggesting bias or
favoritism tend to breed skepticism, undermine the integrity of the
courts, and generally thwart the principles upon which our
jurisprudential system is based. Since an appearance of bias may be
just as damaging to public confidence in the administration of justice as
the actual presence of bias, acts or conduct giving the appearance of
bias should generally be avoided in the same way as acts or conduct
that inexorably bespeak partiality."
Indeed, these notions of skepticism and damage to public confidence
in the administration of justice have been evident in publicized cases."
25. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502 (972); see also Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 469
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[T]he appearance of evenhanded justice... is at the core of due
process."); Offut v. United States, 348 U.S. ii, 14 (1954) ("[J]ustice must satisfy the appearance of
justice.").
26. See MODEL CODE, supra note 3, at Canon i cmt. ("Deference to the judgments and rulings of
courts depends upon public confidence in the integrity and independence of judges."); see also FLAMM,
supra note 5, § 5.4J, at 148 ("The primary rationale for allowing disqualification to be sought on the
basis of appearances stems from the recognized need for an unimpeachable judicial system in which
the public has unwavering confidence. Allegations of judicial bias may serve to erode this public
confidence."); Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Do Appearances Matter?: Judicial Impartiality and the Supreme Court
in Bush v. Gore, 61 MD. L. REv. 6o6, 61o (2002) ("That judicial decision-making must appear to be
free of bias is premised on the widely held belief that public confidence is essential to upholding the
legitimacy of the judiciary."); id. at 61i ("[T]he judiciary-especially the appointed judiciary-derives
its authority and legitimacy from the willingness of the people and sister branches of government to
accept and submit to its decisions. Because public confidence is so essential to maintaining the
integrity of the bench, even the appearance of bias, parochialism, or favoritism can threaten the
judicial function.").
27. FLAMM, supra note 5, § 5.4.1, at 15O; see also Jeffrey Rosen, Disgrace, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 25,
2ooo, at 18 (noting that the concerns regarding impartiality in the Supreme Court's Bush v. Gore
decision "have... made it impossible for citizens of the United States to sustain any kind of faith in
the rule of law").
28. One such case was Justice Rehnquist's refusal to recuse himself from participating in Laird v.
Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972). Before his appointment to the Supreme Court, Rehnquist had been the
Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel, and while the appeal in Laird v. Tatum
was pending, Rehnquist had testified about the case before the Senate Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights. In his testimony, he asserted that the challenged Army surveillance activities
were constitutional and stated the case was not justiciable. The Supreme Court ultimately held that the
case was not justiciable, reversing the Court of Appeals on a 5-4 vote, with Rehnquist casting the
deciding vote. See, e.g., FREEDMAN & SMrrH, supra note 2, § 9.02, at 232-36 (discussing Justice
Rehnquist's participation in Laird v. Tatum at length); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and
Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 589, 597-621 (1987) (criticizing Justice Rehnquist's participation in Laird v.
Tatum for reasons including the failure to disclose his connections to the issues, misstating the
applicable facts, misstating the applicable legal standard, and perpetuating questionable recusal
standards); Note, Justice Rehnquist's Decision to Participate in Laird v. Tatum, 73 COLUM. L. REV. so6,
124 (1973) (concluding that Justice Rehnquist's "participation in Laird lacked the appearance of
[VOL. 56:657
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Why, then, do judges sometimes decline to recuse themselves in
situations involving an appearance of bias?
Despite the existence of many types of bias, courts have not always
recognized the full reach of bias. Indeed, historically, the only basis for
recusal was financial interest. Blackstone expressly rejected all possible
reasons for recusal save a direct economic interest. 9 "The early English
courts' nonrecognition of bias as a ground for disqualification extended
even to cases involving familial relationships between judges and
impartiality necessary to maintain public confidence in the Supreme Court").
Another, more recent, example-again involving a refusal by Justice Rehnquist to recuse-was
Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301 (2000) (mem.) (Rehnquist, C.J.). Rehnquist declined to
recuse himself from the Microsoft case even though his son James was representing Microsoft in
related litigation. See Ifill, supra note 26, at 627 (stating that Justice Rehnquist's "summary analysis
and explanation of why recusal [was] not warranted" in the Microsoft case as "deeply flawed"); see
also Supreme Court Update, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 2, 2000, at 12 (noting that Professor Stephen Gillers, a
legal ethics expert, concluded that Justice Rehnquist should have recused himself from the case).
Of course, Bush v. Gore generated tremendous outcry. Five Justices ended the presidential
election in 2ooo by ordering the stoppage of an ongoing hand recount of the votes cast in the State of
Florida. The Court's decision was based on equal protection grounds. See ALAN M. DERSHOWIFZ,
SUPREME INJUSTICE: How THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED ELECTION 2000 at 206 (2001) ("People will-and
should-trust [the Supreme Court] less, because it proved untrustworthy when tempted by
partisanship and personal advantage [in Bush v. Gore]."); id. at I8O (noting a "widespread suspicion of
the motives of the five justices who, contrary to their own previously expressed judicial views,
rendered a decision that millions of Americans understandably believe was motivated by the desire to
see George W. Bush elected president"). See generally Ifill, supra note 26 (criticizing the refusal to
recuse in Bush v. Gore); see also Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Conflicts of Interest in Bush v. Gore: Did
Some Justices Vote Illegally?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 375 (2003).
The most recent example, as mentioned at the outset of this Article, involved Justice Scalia's
refusal to recuse himself in Cheney v. United States District Court. 124 S. Ct. 1391 (2004) (mem.)
(Scalia, J.) (denying recusal motion). Justice Scalia and Cheney, with others, went on a private hunting
trip, using Air Force Two for travel, just weeks after the Supreme Court granted certiorari in an
energy policy task force case in which Cheney was a named participant. Although Justice Scalia
characterized the lawsuit as a "run-of-the-mill legal dispute about an administrative decision," 124 S.
Ct. at 1396, the district court had ordered Cheney to disclose particular documents, which had the
potential for demonstrating that Cheney had improperly conducted secret task force meetings.
Because Cheney headed the task force and was aware of the necessary preconditions for secrecy, the
ruling necessarily would have implications for Cheney personally; Cheney had a strong personal and
reputational interest in how the matter was resolved. See supra notes 6-io and accompanying text; see
also Bernard Ries, You Can't Duck This Conflict, Mr. Justice, WASH. POST, Feb. 29, 2004, at B4
("While it is true that Cheney is named only in his official capacity in the energy case, what onlooker
would not suppose that he would grin for a week if he should win the case, thereby both vindicating his
position on the law and successfully protecting the identity of the folks with whom he consulted about
energy policy?"); Justice in a Bind, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2004, at A12 (noting that "[s]hould Mr.
Cheney lose in the Supreme Court, there is the potential for deep personal and political
embarrassment"). Justice Scalia's continued participation in the case was widely criticized. See infra
note 156 (citing authorities).
29L See John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges: In Support of the Bayh Bill, 35 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 43, 43-44 n.3 0970) ("[B]lackstone consciously rejected the earlier views of Bracton, who had
said that a judge should disqualify if he were related to a party, if he were hostile to a party, or if he





Despite this historically narrow ground for judicial recusal, over time
Congress repeatedly has amended the recusal statute, and "in each
instance Congress enlarged the enumerated grounds for seeking
disqualification."3 ' Today, the federal recusal statute contains a specific
list of circumstances identifying mandatory recusal situations," as well as
a catch-all provision mandating recusal whenever a judge's "impartiality
might reasonably be questioned."33 However, vestiges of the historical
approach to recusal remain. The recusal statute's strongest provision is
reserved for those circumstances involving a financial interest, providing
that a judge must recuse himself when "[h]e knows that he, individually
or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his household,
has a financial interest in the subject matter of the controversy."'  The
statute subsequently defines "financial interest" as "ownership of a legal
or equitable interest, however small."35 This emphasis on financial
interests is similarly reflected in the disclosures required of federal
judges, which address only financial holdings. 6
The current popularity of law and economics also has tended to
return the focus of judicial recusal to economic interests. Under
economic theory, wealth maximization is the primary motivator behind
human behavior,37 and accordingly, our system of rights is derived from a
goal of maximizing wealth."5 One proponent of the economic approach to
30. FLAMM, supra note 5, § 1.2.2, at 7; see also Brookes v. Rivers, 145 Eng. Rep. 569 (Ex. 1668)
(noting that a judge need not recuse himself from a case involving his brother-in-law "for favour shall
not be presumed in a judge").
31. FLAMM, supra note 5, § 23.1, at 672; see also Bassett, supra note Io, at 1223-28 (tracking the
legislative amendments to the recusal provisions since 1792); Leubsdorf, supra note 3, at 246
("Congress has supplemented its original disqualification statute of 1792 five times, in each instance
expanding the scope of disqualification.").
32. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (2000).
33. Id. at § 455(a).
34- Id. at § 455(b)(4).
35. Id. § 455(d)(4) (emphasis added); see Leslie W. Abramson, Specifying Grounds for Judicial
Disqualification in Federal Courts, 72 NEB. L. REV. IO46, 1070 (1993) (noting that "a financial interest
commands recusal if no specified exception applies and regardless of whether the outcome of the
proceeding could have any effect on the interest").
36. See Ethics in Government Act, §§ 101-102, 5 U.S.C. app. 4 (2000); see also Carelli, supra note
4 (noting that federal law requires federal judges to submit financial disclosure forms).
37. See Sean J. Griffith, Ethical Rules and Collective Action: An Economic Analysis of Legal
Ethics, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 347, 349 (2002) (noting "the fundamental insight of economic analysis: that
individuals act in their self-interest to maximize their individual welfare").
38. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 109 (1981); see also id. at 74 ("Wealth
maximization provides a foundation not only for a theory of rights and of remedies but for the concept
of law itself."). The economic analysis of law has been the subject of extensive commentary and
criticism. See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behaviorial Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1471, 1545 (1998) ("Traditional law and economics is largely based on the standard assumptions
of neoclassical economics. These assumptions are sometimes useful but often false.").
In the wake of increasing questions about the sanctity of [law and economics'] rational
[Vol. 56:657
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law is Justice Scalia, who has attempted to equate the concept of
"fairness" solely with economic factors such as reliance, apparently
concerned that otherwise "the potential vagaries of 'fairness' raise the
spectre of judicial activism."39 This transformation of fairness into an
economic concept is reflected in current recusal practices.4' "[A
particularly] troubling thing about current recusal jurisprudence is the
emphasis the Court places on financial ties, to the apparent exclusion of
all other entanglements.""
Due to the emphasis on financial interests, a dichotomy currently
exists between recusal for financial versus most non-financial interests:
any doubts about potential bias resulting from a financial interest
generally are resolved in favor of recusal, whereas any doubts about
potential bias resulting from most non-financial interests tend to be
resolved in favor of participating in the case. Studies have shown that
judges are most likely to recuse themselves from cases involving an
actual or suggested financial interest in the pending matter, and are far
less likely to recuse themselves from matters involving a possible non-
financial bias.42
choice assumptions, the proponents of rational choice theory retrenched, as defenders of
criticized paradigms often do, and developed more sophisticated ways to paper over its
empirical shortcomings and to denounce its critics as overly concerned with minor details
not truly important to a general understanding of human behavior or to the critical analysis
of law.
Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behaviorial Science: Removing the Rationality
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. IO51, 1056-57 (2ooo).
39. Debra Lyn Bassett, In the Wake of Schooner Peggy: Deconstructing Legislative Retroactivity
Analysis, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 453, 5i1 (2001); see, e.g., Burnham v. Super. Ct., 495 U.S. 604, 623 (199o)
(criticizing the concurrence's proposed standard of 'contemporary notions of due process' as
measuring "state-court jurisdiction not only against traditional doctrines in this country, including
current state-court practice, but also against each Justice's subjective assessment of what is fair and
just," rendering the proposed standard "subjectiv[e], and hence inadequa[te]").
40. See Jeff Bleich & Kelly Klaus, Deciding Whether to Decide, 48 FED. LAW. 45, 46 (Feb. 2001)
("In practice, each individual justice makes the call on what sort of 'participation' or 'interest' qualifies
[for recusal]. And judging by the cases where this has come up publicly, the governing principle
remains that it all comes down to money.").
The only consistent exception to the Court's generally laissez-faire attitude toward
disqualification continues to be... money. Each year the greatest number of recusals is
logged by Justice O'Connor, who, it appears, has investments in several U.S. corporations
(most notably, AT&T) that have sought Court review. The frequency with which she has
recused herself in cases involving these parties has caused Court-watchers to give such cases
the acronym "OOPS" (O'Connor Owns Party Stock).
Id.
41. Id. at 47.
42. See JEFFREY M. SHAMAN & JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: AN EMPIRICAL
STUDY OF JUDICIAL PRACTICES AND ATTITUDES t (1995) (finding almost one-half of the judges indicated
a strong disposition toward disqualification on questions involving financial conflicts of interest, but on
questions reflecting possible judicial bias or prejudice, a majority of the responding judges indicated
ambivalence regarding the decision to disqualify-and one-third indicated a strong disposition against
disqualification); Jona Goldschmidt & Jeffrey M. Shaman, Judicial Disqualification: What Do Judges
Think?, 8o JUDICATURE 68, 70 (1996) (citing an American Judicature Society study finding that
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Although a substantial financial self-interest certainly warrants
recusal, a financial interest is not the only-nor the most serious-form
of bias. Admittedly, financial self-interest permits a straightforward and
objective determination-either there is or is not a financial interest-
whereas some other forms of bias often require a less clear and
subjective determination.43 However, the subjective nature of other forms
of bias does not render it a less valid basis for recusal. To the contrary, a
situation can raise questions regarding judicial impartiality under a
myriad of circumstances-monetary interests hold no monopoly. Indeed,
recusal for a miniscule financial interest is much less compelling than
recusal due to a close personal friendship with a party in the litigation.
"While having a financial stake in a case may create a real conflict of
interest, money is by no means the only or most powerful influence on
people's judgments. As Winston Churchill noted, people are far more
likely to be corrupted by friendship than by anything else."'
Focusing so intently on financial interests minimizes the potentially
corrupting nature of non-financial interests, and essentially downplays
the necessity of recusal for such non-financial interests. Thus, an undue
emphasis on financial interests actually serves to undermine the purpose
of recusal, which more broadly seeks "to promote public confidence in
the impartiality of the judicial process. '
Beyond financial interests, other types of bias-both conscious and
unconscious" -exist that are harder to recognize. A growing wealth of
legal commentary addresses the potential effects of heuristics,47 cognitive
illusions,4 and other biases upon judicial decision-making.49 For example,
situations involving financial conflicts of interest "are the easiest for judges to resolve through
disqualification").
43. See Abramson, supra note 35, at 1051 (noting that "filn part, the difficulty in applying the
personal bias standard results from its subjectivity").
44. Bleich & Klaus, supra note 40, at 47; see also Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral
Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. io6o, io7t (976) (stating that a friend "acts
in your interests, not his own; or rather he adopts your interests as his own").
45. H.R. RaP. No. 93-1453, at 5 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6355; S. RaP. No. 93-
49, at 5 (i974).
46. See Bassett, supra note io, at 1216-17 (noting that "[s]ome potential biases.., are recognized
readily," whereas other kinds of bias "are more difficult, or even impossible, for judges to recognize
within themselves"); see also infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text (discussing unconscious bias).
47. "Heuristics" are, in essence, mental shortcuts. See Richard E. Nisbett et al., The Use of
Statistical Heuristics in Everyday Inductive Reasoning, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTUmVE JUDGMENT 51O (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) (describing heuristics as "rapid and more
or less automatic judgmental rules of thumb"); see also Shane Frederick, Automated Choice Heuristics,
in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra, at 548 (describing
heuristics as the mechanism "people use to simplify choice-the procedures they use to limit the
amount of information that is processed or the complexity of the ways it is combined"); id. at 548-49
(distinguishing "choice heuristics" from "heuristics and biases," explaining that the latter "are largely
based on impressions that occur automatically and independently of any explicit judgmental goal").
48. "Cognitive illusions" are essentially the cognitive errors "that infect human reasoning."
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bias may exist due to stereotypes and ideologies."0 Although a judge's
conscious awareness of bias does not eliminate all concern, unconscious
bias-which often includes prejudice-is even more problematic because
the judge's lack of awareness prevents any action to eliminate
preferences.51
Recent studies indicate that prejudiced responses are largely
unconscious." Until the I98os, most psychologists assumed that attitudes,
Robert E. Scott, Error and Rationality in Individual Decisionmaking: An Essay on the Relationship
Between Cognitive Illusions and the Management of Choices, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 329, 334 (1986). The
elements of a cognitive illusion include:
(1) A formal rule that specifies how to determine a correct (usually, the correct) answer to
an intellectual question;
(2) A judgment, made without the aid of physical tools, that answers the question; and
(3) A systematic discrepancy between the correct answer and the judged answer. (Random
errors don't count.)
Ward Edwards & Detlof von Winterfeldt, Cognitive Illusions and Their Implications for the Law, 59 S.
CAL. L. REV. 225, 227 (1986).
49. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 779-80 (2OOI)
(analyzing judicial susceptibility to cognitive illusions and biases); Arthur J. Lurigio et al.,
Understanding Judges' Sentencing Decisions: Attributions of Responsibility and Story Construction, in
APPLICATIONS OF HEURISTICS AND BIASES TO SOCIAL ISSUES 91 (Linda Heath et al. eds., 1994); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 595--602
(1998) (discussing phenomenon of hindsight bias and its effects upon the judiciary); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REV. 61, 102
(20oo) (discussing effects of heuristics and biases upon judges). See generally Korobkin & Ulen, supra
note 38, at 1075-1102 (summarizing the most common heuristics and biases). But see Gregory
Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and
Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 67-72 (20o2) (challenging "behavioral law and
economics' assumption of uniformly imperfect rationality"-in which "biases and errors lead to
predictably irrational behavior"-as oversimplified and "not faithful to the [psychological] empirical
data on judgment and choice").
50. See Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences,
Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 176 (1992).
51. See infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text (discussing social science research into
unconscious bias).
52. See Mahzarin R. Banaji & Anthony G. Greenwald, Implicit Gender Stereotyping in Judgments
of Fame, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 181 (995) (finding unconscious gender stereotyping
in fame judgments, and finding that explicit expressions of sexism or stereotypes were uncorrelated
with the observed unconscious gender bias); Irene V. Blair & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Automatic and
Controlled Processes in Stereotype Priming, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1142, 1142 (1996)
(concluding that "stereotypes may be automatically activated"); Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and
Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 5 (1989)
(finding that stereotypes are "automatically activated in the presence of a member (or some symbolic
equivalent) of the stereotyped group and that low-prejudice responses require controlled inhibition of
the automatically activated stereotype"); John F. Dovidio et al., On the Nature of Prejudice: Automatic
and Controlled Processes, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 510, 512 (1997) (noting that "[a]versive
racism has been identified as a modem form of prejudice that characterizes the racial attitudes of
many Whites who endorse egalitarian values, who regard themselves as nonprejudiced, but who
discriminate in subtle, rationalizable ways"); Kerry Kawakami et al., Racial Prejudice and Stereotype
Activation, 24 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 407, 407 (1998) ("[H]igh prejudiced participants
endorsed cultural stereotypes to a greater extent than low prejudiced participants. Furthermore, for
high prejudiced participants, [African-American] category labels facilitated stereotype activation
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including prejudice and stereotypes, operated consciously.53 Accordingly,
many researchers used self-reporting to measure attitudes and
stereotypes. 4 More recently, however, psychologists have emphasized
that attitudes have "explicit" and "implicit" indices:
Explicit measures of attitudes operate in a conscious mode and are
exemplified by traditional self-report measures. Implicit attitudes, in
contrast, operate in an unconscious fashion and represent
"introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) traces of past
experience that mediate favorable or unfavorable feeling, thought, or
action toward social objects."55
These studies of unconscious bias confirm the observation that
people who claim, and honestly believe, they are not Frejudiced may
nevertheless harbor unconscious stereotypes and beliefs.5 Thus, although
judges should be constantly vigilant for potential biases and prejudices,
they will not always recognize their own biases and stereotypes. "[E]ven
honest judges ... may be swayed by unacknowledged motives."57 The
existence of unconscious bias means that judges cannot necessarily trust
their subjective belief that they can remain impartial.
Any number of factors may be implicated in a failure to recuse,
including lack of understanding of the recusal standard, arrogance,
denial, defensiveness, or simply the judge's personal belief in his or her
impartiality. At times, all of these factors appear to be at work.
Arrogance can result from an undue reliance upon the lifetime tenure of
federal judges's and their oath of impartiality. 9 As has been noted,
however, "[m]uch harm is done by the myth that, merely by putting on a
black robe and taking the oath of office as a judge, a man ceases to be
human and strips himself of all predilections, becomes a passionless
thinking machine." ' In particular, recent commentators have challenged
the idea that judges, however well-meaning, are able to shake their biases
under automatic and controlled processing conditions.").
53. See Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-
Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4, 4 (i995).
54- Id.
55. Dovidio et al., supra note 52, at 51i (citing Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji,
Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem & Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 8 (1995)).
56. Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 53, at i5; see also Devine, supra note 52, at 5-7 (discussing
unconscious bias).
57. Leubsdorf, supra note 3, at 277.
58. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 44(b), 134(a) (2000) (providing lifetime tenure for federal judges).
59. See id. § 453.
Each justice or judge of the United States shall take the following oath or affirmation
before performing the duties of this office: "I, - , do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I
will administer justice without respect tb persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the
rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent
upon me as - under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God."
6o. In re Linahan, 138 F.zd 650, 652-53 (2d Cir. 1943).
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and prejudices at will. 6 I "[A]ll judges, as a part of basic human
functioning, bring to each decision a package of personal biases and
beliefs that may unconsciously and unintentionally affect the
decisionmaking process.
62
Unfortunately, many judges respond to potential recusal situations
with a defensive-sometimes arrogant-"I am not biased; I can be fair.
'" 63
As one commentator has observed, "judges are typically appalled if their
impartiality is called into question[,] ... believ[ing] themselves to be
consistently objective, impartial and fair."' Another commentator,
sharing the same view, noted: "Although we all like to think that the
justices are paragons of reason with no irrational or self-interested
prejudices on any subject, apparently no one likes to think this more than
the justices do; indeed, based on their decisions, justices rarely, if ever,
perceive that others might sense impropriety in their deciding a case."
65
This phenomenon is the manifestation of still another form of bias,
known as egocentric bias, in which one tends to overestimate one's
abilities. 66
The "I'm not biased" approach to potential recusal situations
implicates two concerns. First, and most importantly, the "I'm not
biased" approach completely misses the point of recusal standards.
Neither the federal recusal statute nor the ethical codes, by their terms,
require actual bias in fact, but instead require recusal when appearances
6I. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Sweeping Reform from Small Rules? Anti-Bias Canons as a
Substitute for Heightened Scrutiny, 85 MINN. L. REV. 363, 370 (2000) (discussing judicial bias in the
context of sexual orientation); Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or
Adaptation?, supra note 49, at 64 (noting that judges are susceptible to various biases).
62. Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 3 (1994).
63. See ALAN J. CHASET, DISQUALIFICATION OF FEDERAL JUDGES BY PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE 58
(198i) (noting that "[j]udges, like other persons, are likely to resent charges of bias"); FLAMM, supra
note 5, § 1.10-5, at 25 (noting that "[just as judges generally do not like to admit having committed
legal error, they are typically less than eager to acknowledge the existence of situations that may raise
questions about their impartiality"). Of course, not all judges respond to recusal matters in a defensive
manner. Indeed, one prominent exception to the defensive approach appeared in Bernard v. Coyne (In
re Bernard), 31 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 1994). In Bernard, Judge Alex Kozinski stated that "judges have a
professional responsibility not to take such challenges personally." Id. at 846 n.8: see also id. at 847
(noting that "[c]ounsel for a party who believes a judge's impartiality is reasonably subject to question
has not only a professional duty to his client to raise the matter, but an independent responsibility as
an officer of the court").
64. Nugent, supra note 62, at 5; cf. Dacher Keltner & Robert J. Robinson, Extremism, Power, and
the Imagined Basis of Social Conflict, 5 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 10, 102-03 (1996)
(noting that "opposing partisans indicated that they were more objective, fairer to the evidence, and
freer from bias" with respect both to their opponents and to other partisans on their own side).
65. Bleich & Klaus, supra note 40, at 47.
66. See Guthrie et al., supra note 49, at 811 ("People tend to make judgments about themselves
and their abilities that are 'egocentric' or 'self-serving."'); id. at 814-15 ("[Mlost people genuinely
believe that they are better than average at a variety of endeavors.... Egocentric biases might prevent
judges from maintaining an awareness of their limitations .... More generally, egocentric biases may
make it hard for judges to recognize that they can and do make mistakes.").
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might suggest bias to an outsider.
[I]nstances of judicial preconception often are innocent in intent. Most
judges genuinely believe that, despite their connections to a lawsuit,
they can put aside their bias or interest, and decide the suit justly. What
this ignores, unfortunately, is that partiality is more likely to affect the
unconscious thought processes of a judge, with the result that he or she
has little conscious knowledge of being swayed by improper influences.
Furthermore, even if a judge were able to put aside bias and self-
interest in a particular case, the appearance of impropriety remains,
and is itself a serious problem that casts disrepute upon the judiciary.
Accordingly, the judge's belief that she is not biased is not
conclusive, and indeed, is irrelevant.69 "[W]henever a judge's impartiality
might reasonably be questioned by others, it is ordinarily his duty to
disqualify himself without regard to his own subjective belief that he can
dispense justice fairly and equitably."'7
Promoting public confidence in the judiciary necessarily requires
viewing judicial practices from the perspective of the general public. In
particular, bias or prejudice must be viewed from the perspective of the
public, rather than that of the judiciary, for two reasons. First, bias and
prejudice are notoriously difficult to recognize within ourselves. Thus,
doubts as to how the public might view a judge's participation in the
case must be resolved in favor of recusal. Second, public confidence in
the judiciary does not result from the judiciary's perception of
impartiality; it results from the public's perception of impartiality.
Thus, a judge's belief that he or she is not biased is simply of little
consequence to a recusal determination.7'
The second concern implicated by the "I'm not biased" approach is
the reality that such insistence often, in fact, suggests exactly the
opposite.72 Indeed, one commentator has observed that "the most biased
67. See FLAMM, supra note 5, § 5.5, at 153-54 ("[T]he dispositive question ... is not whether a
judge is impartial in fact but whether a reasonable person-not knowing whether the judge is actually
impartial-would be apt to question her impartiality."); id. § 5.6.4, at 162-63 (noting that "the charge
of partiality must be based on facts that would create a reasonable doubt concerning the judge's
impartiality.., in the mind of a reasonable, uninvolved observer").
68. LESLIE W. ABRAMSON, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION UNDER CANON 3 OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT XI (2d ed. 1992).
69. See FLAMM, supra note 5, § 5.6.2, at i57:
The 'appearance of bias' standard . . . does not contemplate that the converse will
necessarily be true-that when a judge is convinced of his ability to preside impartially he
may properly deny a disqualification motion. On the contrary, the judge's actual state of
mind or lack of partiality is generally considered beside the point because a judge who is
convinced of his own impartiality, as well as the purity of his motives, may nonetheless act
in a manner that would lead a reasonable person to believe he is biased.
Id.
70. Id.
71. Bassett, supra note io, at 1245-46.
72. See Leubsdorf, supra note 3, at 244 (noting that a judge's defensiveness in writing her opinion
denying a disqualification motion "may prop up the judge's sense of her own rectitude; reading it often
increases one's dismay that the judge insists on sitting").
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judges [are often] the least willing to withdraw."73 Accordingly, when a
judge finds herself denying the existence of bias, that very denial may
suggest the necessity of reconsidering recusal.
Despite the aim of recusal to avoid bias in judicial decision-making,
this goal is not being achieved under the current law. If certain biases are
indeed unconscious, perhaps no recusal provision can reach them, which
leaves the question how to reach as many forms of bias as possible.
Although financial bias currently is given an undue emphasis, the result
of financial disclosures and the statutory reference to "de minimis"
financial interests appears to have resulted in an increased awareness of
the potential for bias in that context.74 Perhaps judicial disclosures related
to other interests might increase judicial awareness of potential non-
financial forms of bias. The next Section explores the current law-the
specific statutes, rules, and disclosure provisions related to the recusal of
federal judges.
II. THE LAW GOVERNING THE RECUSAL OF FEDERAL JUDGES
Federal judges generally find ethical guidance from two sources-
the applicable ethical code and the United States Code. In addition, in
1993, the United States Supreme Court issued a "Statement of Recusal
Policy," which pertains only to the Supreme Court.75 The statutory
provisions from the United States Code are the authority cited in the
recusal and disqualification case law most often, and accordingly, the
statutes provide the starting point for this Section.
A. STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Three federal statutes address the recusal and disqualification of
federal judges. In addition, federal statutes require federal judges to file
annual statements of their personal financial interests. 76 The first federal
statute-section 47-is a straightforward provision prohibiting judges
from hearing on appeal any cases in which they served as the trial judge.77
The second-section i44-applies by its terms only to district court
judges,7s and sets forth the procedures for filing a judicial disqualification
73. Id. at 245; see also id. at 277 ("The most biased judges may be the most persuaded that their
acts are just.").
74. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (noting that judges are most likely to recuse
themselves for financial interests).
75. See Press Release, United States Supreme Courti Statement of Recusal Policy (Nov. i, 1993),
reprinted in FLAMM, supra note 5, at lO68-70.
76. See Ethics in Government Act, §§ I0I-109, 5 U.S.C. app. 4 (2ooo) (requiring federal judges
annually to file personal financial statements available for public inspection).
77. See 28 U.S.C. § 47 (2ooo) ("No judge shall hear or determine an appeal from the decision of a
case or issue tried by him.").
78. Id. § 144. Section 144 provides:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and
sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or
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motion when "the judge before whom the matter is pending has a
personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse
party. 1
79
The remaining federal statute - section 455-is more comprehensive
and appears by its terms to apply to federal judges at every level,
including the United States Supreme Court. Section 455 states that its
provisions apply to "[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the
United States." Any "justice" would appear to include Supreme Court
Justices, since only Supreme Court jurists are called "justices" in the
federal judiciary. Understanding section 455 as written today requires
some knowledge of its history and, in particular, its previous (and now
repudiated) subjective standard and the so-called "duty to sit."
I. Rejected Recusal Notions: The Subjective Standard and the
"Duty to Sit"
In its original formulation, section 455 employed a largely subjective
standard, leaving recusal to the judge's own personal opinion as to
whether it would be "improper" to hear the case, unless the judge had
been a material witness, of counsel, or possessed a "substantial" interest
in the case, in which instance recusal was mandatory.8 Indeed, the "duty
to sit" doctrine required judges to decide borderline recusal questions in
favor of participating in the case.82 Under the "duty to sit" doctrine,
judicial decisions "articulated [a] strong 'duty to sit' that was generally
construed in such a way as to oblige the assigned judge to hear a case
unless and until an unambiguous demonstration of extrajudicial bias was
prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no
further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.
The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice
exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before the beginning of the term at which the
proceeding is to be heard, or good cause shall be shown for failure to file it within such time.
A party may file only one such affidavit in any case. It shall be accompanied by a certificate
of counsel of record stating that it is made in good faith.
Id.; see Bernard v. Coyne (In re Bernard), 31 F.3d 842, 843 11.3 (9 th Cir. 1994) (noting that section i44
"applies only to district judges, not appellate judges"); Hepperle v. Johnston, 590 F.2d 609, 613 (5th
Cir. 1979) (noting that section 144 "by its terms applies only to district judges"); Pilla v. Am. Bar
Ass'n, 542 F.2d 56, 58 (8th Cir. 1976) ("Section I44 is limited in application to proceedings in a district
court.").
79. 28 U.S.C. § 144.
80. Id. § 455(a).
8I. The previous version of section 455 provided:
Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any case in which he has
a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has been a material witness, or is so related
to or connected with any party or his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for
him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding therein.
H.R. REP. No. 93-1453, at 2 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6352.
82. Id. at 5; see Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837 (972) (mem.) (Rehnquist, J.) (stating that a
federal judge "has a duty to sit where not disqualified which is equally as strong as the duty to not sit
where disqualified") (emphasis in original).
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made.""3 As Professor Stempel has explained, under this doctrine,
in cases where the challenged judge faces a serious and close
disqualification decision, the judge should decide in favor of sitting and
against recusal in order to minimize intrusions on fellow judges and
enhance judicial efficiency, as well as to discourage the bringing of
disqualification motions by litigants as a variant of forum or judge
shopping. &
4
However, Congress eliminated both the subjective standard and the
"duty to sit" doctrine in 1974s' Motivated by the widespread perception
that the subjective recusal standard had failed, Congress amended
section 455 ."6 "[P]rior to the 1974 amendments to [section] 455, federal
judges often expressly relied on the 'duty to sit rule' to deny
disqualification motions in all but the most blatant of circumstances." Y
The 1974 amendments reversed the presumption:
With the enactment of the 1974 amendments to [section] 455, the duty
to sit rule was displaced by a 'presumption of disqualification' such
that, after those amendments went into effect, whenever a judge
harbored any doubts whether his disqualification was warranted, he
was to resolve those doubts in favor of disqualification.8
Indeed, changes to both section 455 and the ABA Model Code of
Judicial Conduct were expressly aimed at abolishing the so-called "duty
to sit."
89
83. Flamm, supra note 5, § 20.10.1, at 613.
84. Stempel, supra note 28, at 604.
85. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1453, at 2, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 6354-55 (eliminating the
subjective standard and the "duty to sit" doctrine).
86. See Bassett, supra note Io, at 1225 (noting that the 1974 amendments "resulted from financial
conflict of interest concerns raised during the confirmation hearings concerning Judge Clement
Haynsworth, Jr.'s nomination to the United States Supreme Court in 1969, as well as other scandals
and controversies"); id. at 1225 n.63 ("The concerns involved whether Judge Haynsworth should have
recused himself from five different cases, where he had a small financial interest, which had come
before him during his tenure on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit."); see also
FLAMM, supra note 5, § 23.6.1, at 678-79 (stating that the "notoriety arising from... [the Haynsworth]
situation, as well as from a number of highly publicized cases involving other judges' refusals to
disqualify themselves despite apparent or actual conflicts of interest, began to kindle public sentiment
for altering the standards for disqualifying federal judges"). See generally JOHN P. MACKENZIE, THE
APPEARANCE Of JUS'nCE (1974) (describing as examples of scandal and controversy, among others, the
indictment of Judge Otto Kerner of the Seventh Circuit and the Senate's failure to approve Justice
Abe Fortas as Chief Justice).
87. Flamm, supra note 5, § 20.10.1, at 614.
88. Id. § 2o.io.i, at 614-15; see also Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 352 (ioth Cir. 1995) (noting that
"[i]f the question of whether § 455(a) requires recusal is a close one, the balance tips in favor of
recusal").
89. See FLAMM, supra note 5, § 20.io.1, at 614 (noting the American Bar Association's adoption of
Canon 3E in the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which "was expressly designed to do away
with the duty to sit concept"); see also id. (noting that the 1974 amendments to section 455 were
"intended to harmonize the statute with the [ABA Model] Code").
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2. Recusal Where a Judge's Impartiality "Might Reasonably Be
Questioned"
Today, subsection (b) of section 455 lists specific circumstances in
which federal judges must recuse themselves.' In addition, subsection (a)
provides a broader catch-all standard, requiring that "[a]ny justice, judge,
or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned."9
The use of the word "shall" indicates that when the standard is met,
recusal is mandatory rather than left to the judge's discretion." This leads
to the standard itself. -
Section 455(a) requires recusal when the judge's "impartiality might
90. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (2o00) provides:
He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(i) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge
of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a
lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer
concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning
it;
(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated
as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion
concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy;
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing
in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to
the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of
the proceeding;
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of
them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party;
(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the
outcome of the proceeding;
(iv) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.
Id. Recusal under section 455(a) "is mandatory whenever any fact reasonably suggests that the judge
appears to lack impartiality, where as under section 455(b) recusal is mandatory when certain
specifically enumerated circumstances create a presumption that the judge lacks impartiality." FLAMM,
supra note 5, § 24.1, at 686. Subsection (b)(4) imposes a "rigid per se rule." Id. § 24.6.2, at 698. Waiver
of any ground for disqualification enumerated in subsection (b) is prohibited. 28 U.S.C. § 455(e). Thus,
the parties cannot agree to waive a judge's disqualification due to financial interest. FLAMM, supra note
5, § 24.9.1, at 712-13:
[P]roposals to amend section 455 to permit express waiver of the statutory grounds for
disqualification were criticized on the ground that parties with valid objections to a judge
might be intimidated into agreeing to a waiver. Congress voiced concern about the
possibility of federal judges wielding a 'velvet blackjack.' ... Congress ultimately concluded
that confidence in the impartiality of federal judges would be enhanced by not permitting
waiver and, in fact, that to allow express waiver would defeat the purpose of the judicial
disqualification statutes.
Id.
91. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
92. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1233 (5th ed. 1979) ("As used in statutes, contracts, or the like,
this word ["shall"] is generally imperative or mandatory.").
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reasonably be questioned." The key word in this standard is "might."
Professor Abramson has defined "might" as "expressing especially a
shade of doubt of a lesser degree of possibility."'93 In close cases, any
doubts are to be resolved in favor of recusal. 4 As standards go, this is
reasonably clear. However, some federal courts-and some Supreme
Court Justices-have attempted to rewrite the statutory language to
change "might" to "would."
[Tlhere is a tendency for some judges and commentators-and
particularly for advocates opposing disqualification -to slip away from
the statutory language, turning "might" into "could" or "would." The
differences are important. The word "might" is used to express
"tentative possibility;" "could" is used to express "possibility;" while"would" connotes what "will" happen or is "going to" happen.
Accordingly, the word "would" requires significantly more than a
tentative possibility of doubt regarding a judge's impartiality, and use
of the word "would" therefore produces a subtle but substantial
change in the meaning of the statute.95
The statutory standard is clear, requiring recusal when a judge's
impartiality "might" reasonably be questioned. Neither actual bias nor a
probability of bias is required. Moreover, section 455 contains no
procedural component; the language of section 455 indicates that the
statute is self-enforcing.9
93. Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge's Impartiality
"Might Reasonably Be Questioned," 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 58 (20OO) (citing WEBSTER'S NEW
WORLD COLLEGE DICrnONARY 859 (3d ed. 1997)). The Supreme Court has previously held that
constitutional due process requires recusal if the circumstances "might create an impression of possible
bias." Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
94. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (noting presumption in favor of recusal).
95. FREEDMAN & SmrTH, supra note 2, § 9.06, at 242-43. An example is cited by Professors
Freedman and Smith involving a Supreme Court Justice:
[Justice Stephen] Breyer, when sitting in the First Circuit, had written an opinion that could
well have had a devastating impact on Breyer's own financial well-being as a member of
Lloyd's of London[, but Breyer failed] to recuse himself. Then White House Counsel Lloyd
Cutler contended that reasonable people differed about whether Breyer's impartiality in the
case was questionable, and that Breyer therefore was not required to recuse himself.
That argument would have force if the statute required disqualification only when a
reasonable person would question the judge's impartiality.... Under the statute as enacted,
however, if reasonable people do disagree, then clearly a reasonable person might question
the judge's impartiality, and recusal is required.
Id. at 243 (emphasis in original).
96. See FLAMM, supra note 5, § 23.5.1, at 676 (noting that amendments to section 455 in 1948
"convert[ed] [section] 455 from a 'challenge-for-cause' provision to a 'self-enforcing' disqualification
provision"); Aronson v. Brown, 14 F.3d 1578, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("[Slection 455 is 'self-enforcing' in
that it is self-executing; that is, a judge may recuse sua sponte."); see also Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d
1189, 1200 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Recusal under Section 455 is self-executing; a party need not file affidavits
in support of recusal and the judge is obligated to recuse herself sua sponte under the stated
circumstances."); United States v. Story, 716 F.2d io88, Io9i (6th Cir. 1983) ("[S]ection 455 is self-
executing, requiring the judge to disqualify himself for personal bias even in the absence of a party
complaint."); Davis v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1O51 (5th Cir. 1975) (finding that no
motion is required to precipitate a judge's recusal under section 455).
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Thus, section 455 requires a federal judge to recuse herself not only
for actual bias, but also when her "impartiality might reasonably be
questioned."
If dictionary definitions are indicative of how a word is to be
understood, judges perhaps should be wary of rejecting a motion to
disqualify for the appearance of partiality. When the dictionary
meaning of "might" includes "expressing especially a shade of doubt or
a lesser degree of possibility," use of that term ... would seem to
require "a judge to err on the side of caution by favorin recusal to
remove any reasonable doubt as to his or her impartiality."
Accordingly, section 455 requires that any doubts be resolved in
favor of recusal. The Court's decisions addressing section 455 are limited
in number and provide some additional insight.
3. Case Law Interpreting Section 455
The United States Supreme Court has issued four major opinions
touching on section 455: United States v. Will,0 Liljeberg v. Health
Services Acquisition Corp.,' Liteky v. United States,"° and Sao Paulo
State of the Federative Republic of Brazil v. American Tobacco Co.'°I
United States v. Will is of limited usefulness to our inquiry because
the Court's discussion focused on whether section 455 intended to repeal
the "rule of necessity .... . The "rule of necessity" is a common law
doctrine permitting a judge with an otherwise disqualifying conflict of
interest to hear the case if all other judges are similarly disqualified. 3 In
a cursory, summary analysis, the Court concluded that the purpose of
section 455 "gives no hint of altering the ancient Rule of Necessity, a
doctrine that had not been questioned under prior judicial
disqualification statutes."' 4 Thus, the Court concluded, the "rule of
necessity" remained intact.
Liteky v. United States is of similarly limited usefulness because the
Court's discussion focused on the extrajudicial source doctrine, which
requires that any alleged judicial bias derive from outside the pending
legal proceeding. As one commentator has explained, "[T]he alleged bias
must have arisen not from judicial knowledge, opinions, conduct, or
comments that derived from the evidence adduced in a pending or a
97. Abramson, supra note 93, at 58.
98. 449 U.S. 200 (1980).
99. 486 U.S. 847 (1988).
ioo. 510 U.S. 540 (1994).
101. 535 U.S. 229 (2002) (per curiam).
102. Will, 449 U.S. at 213-17.
103. See id. at 213 ("[A] judge had better not, if it can be avoided, take part in the decision of a
case in which he has any personal interest, yet he not only may but must do so if the case cannot be
heard otherwise."); see also infra notes 131-134 and accompanying text (discussing the "rule of
necessity").
io4. Will, 449 U.S. at 217.
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prior proceeding, but by virtue of some factor that arose outside of the
incidents that have taken place in the courtroom itself."' 5 As the Liteky
Court explained:
The fact that an opinion held by a judge derives from a source outside
judicial proceedings is not a necessary condition for "bias or prejudice"
recusal, since predispositions developed during the course of a trial will
sometimes (albeit rarely) suffice. Nor is it a sufficient condition for
"bias or prejudice" recusal, since some opinions acquired outside the
context of judicial proceedings (for example, the judge's view of the
law acquired in scholarly reading) will not suffice.... Thus, judicial
remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of,
or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not
support a bias or partiality challenge. They may do so if they reveal an
opinion that derives from an extrajudicial source; and they will do so if
they reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make
fair judgment impossible.'
Despite its focus on the extrajudicial source doctrine, Liteky
provided at least one point of importance to our inquiry: the Court
observed that what matters under section 455(a) "is not the reality of
bias or prejudice but its appearance," as evaluated on an objective
basis. "0
Perhaps the most helpful of the Supreme Court's decisions is the
Liljeberg case, which addressed section 455(a) and concluded that "even
though [the federal district judge's] failure to disqualify himself was the
product of a temporary lapse of memory, it was nevertheless a plain
violation of the terms of the statute.' '. 8 Concluding that "both the
District Court and the Court of Appeals found an ample basis in the
record for concluding that an objective observer would have questioned
[the judge's] impartiality,"'" the Supreme Court noted that "[s]cienter is
not an element of a violation of [section] 455(a). The judge's lack of
knowledge of a disqualifying circumstance may bear on the question of
remedy, but it does not eliminate the risk that 'his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned' by other persons .....
105. FLAMM, supra note 5, § 4.6.1, at 130-31; see also id. at 131 ("The extrajudicial source rule has
often been stated in another way-to be disqualifying, a judge's alleged bias must be 'personal' rather
than 'judicial' in nature."); Abramson, supra note 93, at 76-78 ("The appearance of impropriety may
emanate from judicial conduct or remarks directed at counsel, her client, a witness, or an issue in a
proceeding.... The appearance of impropriety may require recusal when a judge's remarks about the
parties or a litigation issue results from information discovered outside the judicial proceeding,
because that opinion arises from an extrajudicial source.").
io6. Liteky v. United States, 51o U.S. 540,554-55 (1994).
io7. Id. at 548; see also Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000) (mem.)
(Rehnquist, J.) (stating that under section 455(a), "[the] inquiry is an objective one, made from the
perspective of a reasonable observer who is informed of all the surrounding facts and circumstances").
Io8. Liljeberg v. Health Serv. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 861 (1988).
509. Id.
i io. Id. at 859. The Court also quoted the decision of the Court of Appeals with approval:
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The Court offered some clarification in the San Paulo State case,
noting that section 455(a) "requires judicial recusal 'if a reasonable
person, knowing all the circumstances, would expect that the judge would
have actual knowledge' of his interest or bias in the case .... In San Paulo
State, the judge's name had been added to a motion to file an amicus
brief both mistakenly and without the judge's knowledge; in fact he
"took no part in the preparation or approval of the amicus brief .... The
Court thus concluded that "when [these facts] are taken into account we
think it self-evident that a reasonable person would not believe [the
judge] had any interest or bias."".3..
Additional recusal guidance is available from the ethical codes,
which is the subject of the next Section.
B. THE ETHICAL CODES
Two ethical codes come into play in the federal courts: the Code of
Conduct for United States Judges and the ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct. By its terms, the Code of Conduct for United States Judges"4
applies to "United States Circuit Judges, District Judges, Court of
International Trade Judges, Court of Federal Claims Judges, Bankruptcy
Judges, and Magistrate Judges."" 5 Conspicuously absent from this list of
federal judges are the Justices of the United States Supreme Court."6
Although the Code of Conduct excludes the Supreme Court Justices
from its reach, the Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that another
ethical code-the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct-is relevant to
ethical determinations involving the Court."7 This Section discusses both
The goal of section 455(a) is to avoid even the appearance of partiality. If it would appear to
a reasonable person that a judge has knowledge of facts that would give him an interest in
the litigation then an appearance of partiality is created even though no actual partiality
exists because the judge does not recall the facts, because the judge actually has no interest
in the case or because the judge is pure in heart and incorruptible. The judge's forgetfulness,
however, is not the sort of objectively ascertainable fact that can avoid the appearance of
partiality. [Citation omitted.] Under section 455(a), therefore, recusal is required even when
a judge lacks actual knowledge of the facts indicating his interest or bias in the case if a
reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would expect that the judge would have
actual knowledge.
Id. at 86o-6i.
i i i. San Paulo State of Federative Republic of Brazil v. Am. Tobacco Co., Inc., 535 U.S. 229, 232-
33 (2002).
112. Id. at 233.
I53. Id.
114. See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDOGES, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/
vol2/chi.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2005) [hereinafter CODE OF CONDUCT].
115. Id. at Introduction.
i6. See Neumann, supra note 28, at 386 (stating that the Code of Conduct for United States
Judges does not apply to the Supreme Court Justices because "[tlhe Judicial Conference lacks the
authority to make rules governing the Supreme Court").
117. See, e.g., United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 211-12 & n.12 (I98o) ("Jurisdiction being clear,
our next inquiry is whether 28 U.S.C. § 455 or traditional judicial canons operate to disqualify all
United States judges, including the Justices of this Court, from deciding these issues.") (citing to the
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the Code of Conduct and the ABA Model Code, which are strikingly
similar.
Both the Code of Conduct and the ABA Model Code repeatedly
refer to the "appearance" of impropriety."' Both ethical codes also set
forth a general standard of disqualification from any proceeding "in
which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned,"'"9 and
largely mirror the provisions of section 455 . I2 Another relevant
statement is found in a comment within Canon 3E of the ABA Model
Code, which requires judges to disclose "on the record information that
the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might consider relevant" to
potential disqualification, regardless of the judge's view as to whether
disqualification is warranted. 2'
Canon 3E of the ABA Model Code and Canon 3C of the Code of
Conduct address recusal and disqualification. Canon 3E of the ABA
Model Code provides, in part:
[a] judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not
limited to [when] the judge has a personal bias or prejudice [regarding]
a party or a party's lawyer, [has] personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts, [or] has served as a lawyer [or] been a material
witness [in the matter].'2
Canon 3C of the Code of Conduct is nearly identical to Canon 3E of
the ABA Model Code, except that it omits the reference to personal bias
ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct); Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 1301, 1301 (198o) (mem.)
(Rehnquist, J.) (addressing a motion to recuse and stating, "I have considered the motion, the
Appendices, the response of the state defendants, 28 U.S.C. § 455 [citations omitted], and the current
American Bar Association Code of Judicial Conduct, and the motion is accordingly denied").
118. See CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 114, at Canons 2,3; MODEL CODE, supra note 3, at Canons
2,3,4.
119. See CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 114, at Canon 3C(I); MODEL CODE, supra note 3, at Canon
3E(1). The provisions of the CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNrED STATES JUDGES are strikingly similar to the
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT. See MODEL CODE, supra note 3;
Bassett, supra note to, at 1229-32 (comparing provisions in ABA Model Code of Judicial COnduct and
Code of Conduct for United States Judges). Forty-nine of the fifty states have adopted the ABA
Model Code of Judicial Conduct in some form. See Abramson, supra note 93, at 55 (stating "forty-nine
states have adopted some form of" the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct).
120. The interrelationship among the ABA MODEL CODE, the CODE OF CONDUCT, and section 455
is cemented by Congress's intention that section 455 should conform to the ABA Model Code. See
H.R. REP. No. 1453, at 2, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6358; 119 CONG. REC. 33029 (1973)
(remarks of Sen. Burdick) (articulating intention that section 455 should conform to the ABA Model
Code of Judicial Conduct).
121. See MODEL CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 3E(I) cmt. ("A judge should disclose on the record
information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might consider relevant to the question
of disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no real basis for disqualification.").
122. MODEL CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 3E. Additional disqualifying circumstances involving
economic interests or participation in the matter by the judge or a member of the judge's family are
also detailed in Canon 3E. Id.
March 2005]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
or prejudice concerning a party's lawyer.'23
The ethical codes provide additional detail and explanation, and thus
are helpful supplemental sources of guidance. However, federal judges
often have declined the guidance of the codes, and instead have created
their own interpretations of the statutory proscriptions under section
455 . 24 Often, these judicial interpretations have downplayed the
potential for the appearance of impropriety and instead have attempted
to objectify the reasons for permitting the challenged judge to participate
in the proceedings.'25
C. STATEMENT OF RECUSAL POLICY
In November 1993, seven of the nine United States Supreme Court
Justices ' issued a "Statement of Recusal Policy" addressing situations in
which Justices' relatives have participated in pending cases.'27 The policy
provides, in part:
We think that a relative's partnership in the firm appearing before us,
or his or her previous work as a lawyer on a case that later comes
before us, does not automatically trigger [recusal]....
We do not think it would serve the public interest to go beyond the
requirements of the statute, and to recuse ourselves, out of an excess of
123. See CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 114, at Canon 3C(I). The same additional disqualifying
circumstances involving economic interests or participation in the matter set forth in Canon 3E of the
ABA Model Code also exist in the Code of Conduct. One prominent difference between the two
ethical codes in this regard is that the ABA Model Code sets forth as a disqualifying situation a judge
or member of the judge's family having "any other more than de minimis interest that could be
substantially affected by the proceeding." MODEL CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 3E(1)(c). In the Code
of Conduct, however, although the reference exists to "any other interest that could be affected
substantially by the outcome of the proceeding," there is no reference to "de minimis." See CODE OF
CONDUCT, supra note 114, at Canon 3C(I)(c).
124. See infra note 125 and accompanying text (discussing examples of cases ignoring the ethical
code).
125. See, e.g., Carter v. West Publ'g Co., No. 9 9 -119 5 9 -EE, 1999 WL 994997, at *1-*2, *4 (IIth Cir.
Nov. 1, 1999) (describing a judge who declined to recuse himself from a case where he had previously
traveled to resort-style locations at the defendant's expense, allegedly was personal friends with the
defendant's top executives, and appeared before a subcommittee to advocate a product by the
defendant; relying on section 455, and citing to the Code of Conduct for United States Judges as
permitting judges to participate in "extra-judicial activities" but without citing to the appearance of
bias standard in Canon 3); Strickler v. Pruett, Nos. 97-29, 97-30, 1998 WL 340420, at *12-*I4 (4th Cir.
June 17, 1998) (dealing with a judge who declined to recuse himself from a case involving carjacking
and subsequent murder, where judge's father had been killed during a carjacking four years earlier,
and citing only to section 455); Ball Mem'l Hosp. v. Mut. Hosp. Ins., 788 F.2d 1223, 1224 (7th Cir.
1986) (dealing with a judge who declined to recuse himself from a case where the judge had served as a
consultant for an entity related to the defendant approximately one year earlier, without citing to
section 455 or any ethical code).
126. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Associate Justices Ginsburg, Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia,
Stevens, and Thomas signed the policy. See Statement of Recusal Policy, reprinted in FLAMM, supra
note 5, Addendum to App. A, at io68. Associate Justices Blackmun and Souter did not sign the policy.
Id.
127. Id. at IO68-70.
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caution, whenever a relative is a partner in the firm before us or acted
as a lawyer at an earlier stage....
Absent some special factor, therefore, we will not recuse ourselves
by reason of a relative's participation as a lawyer in earlier stages of the
case.... We shall recuse ourselves whenever, to our knowledge, a
relative has been lead counsel below.
Another special factor, of course, would be the fact that the amount
of the relative's compensation could be substantially affected by the
outcome here. That would require our recusal even if the relative had
not worked on the case, but was merely a partner in the firm that
shared the profits .... " . 8
Although the Statement's applicability is limited to situations
involving relatives of the Justices, it is of great interest in gaining insight
to the Court's perspective on section 455 and recusal generally.
In effect, the 1993 Recusal Policy constitutes the Court's blanket and
prejudged determination that a Justice's impartiality is not reasonably
questioned when a relative is a partner in a firm appearing before the
Court, so long as the Justice's relative receives no direct financial
benefit from the matter before the Court. Rather than applying an
objective reasonable person standard on a case-by-case basis, as
§ 455(a) requires, the Recusal Policy simply reflects the Justices' own
sense of what to them would constitute a reasonable basis upon which
to question a judge's impartiality and applies that standard across the
board.
29
In the Statement of Recusal Policy, the Justices "re-emphasized their
negative view of recusal in cases where actual bias is not at issue.'. 3
Thus, the Supreme Court has made it clear that it has no intention of
following the strict proscriptions of section 455, and instead believes that
the Court's unique nature justifies a less-demanding recusal standard.
In dealing with recusal issues involving federal courts of appeals
judges or United States Supreme Court Justices, the sources of guidance
are limited. For federal circuit court judges, there is the Code of Conduct
and there is section 455. For Supreme Court Justices, there is the Court-
created "Statement of Recusal Policy," which applies only to situations
involving the Justices' relatives; there is the ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct; and again, there is section 455. This leads us to a discussion of
recusal in the specific and unique context of United States Supreme
Court Justices.
128. Id.
129. Ifill, supra note 26, at 626.
130. Id. at 625.
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III. RECUSAL AND THE UNIQUE NATURE OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT
Although the United States Supreme Court has faithfully
interpreted section 455 and the recusal standard in addressing the recusal
of federal district court judges, the Court has not always applied the same
standard to itself. The consistent standard in section 455(a) and the
ethical codes, requiring recusal from "any proceeding in which [the
judge's] impartiality might reasonably be questioned," reflects uniformity
among Congress, the Judicial Council, and the American Bar
Association as to the appropriate recusal standard. But does this
standard apply to Supreme Court Justices? Let's first look at one of the
justifications that Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist has proffered in
defense of a different approach to the recusal of Supreme Court Justices,
which involves a variant of the rule of necessity.
A. "RULE OF NECESSITY"
In large part, the Supreme Court's rationalization for its insistence
upon participating in cases involving potential recusal issues has been
based on a variant of the so-called "rule of necessity" and the "duty to
sit."
The "rule of necessity" was developed in the common law more than
500 years ago,"' and deals with the unremarkable notion that if every
judge eligible to hear a particular case would be disqualified due to
conflicts of interest-such as a case involving a constitutional challenge
to a pay increase for all federal judges-none of the judges will be
considered disqualified on that basis.3 The purpose of the "rule of
necessity," as explained by the Supreme Court, is to provide litigants
their right to a forum.'33
The "rule of necessity" is a rule of extremes. The "rule of necessity"
131. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 213 (1980).
The Rule of Necessity had its genesis at least five and a half centuries ago. Its earliest
recorded invocation was in 1430, when it was held that the Chancellor of Oxford could act
as judge of a case in which he was a party when there was no provision for appointment of
another judge. [Citation omitted.] Early cases in this country confirmed the vitality of the
Rule.
Id. at 213-14.
132. See id. at 213 ("'[A]lthough a judge had better not, if it can be avoided, take part in the
decision of a case in which he has any personal interest, yet he not only may but must do so if the case
cannot be heard otherwise."') (quoting F. POLLACK, A FIRST BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 270 (6th ed.
1929)); see also FLAMM, supra note 5, § 20.2.1, at 589-90 (noting that the "rule of necessity" involves
"the principle that disqualification will not be permitted to destroy the only tribunal with power to act
in the premises-that is, where disqualification would result in an absence of judicial machinery
capable of dealing with a matter, disqualification must yield to necessity").
133. Will, 449 U.S. at 217 ("[Wlithout the Rule [of Necessity], some litigants would be denied their
right to a forum.").
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at the Supreme Court level is not implicated when one Justice is subject
to a disqualifying event or relationship, nor when several Justices are so
affected. The "rule of necessity" applies only when every Supreme Court
Justice would be subject to disqualification.'34
Although not expressly phrased in terms of the "rule of necessity"
(or the "duty to sit"), some Supreme Court Justices have not followed
section 455 as written, but instead have used a less stringent standard.
The clear implication of this lesser standard is that recusal at the
Supreme Court level removes an important voice from the decision-
making process (at best) and risks an inadequate number of Justices to
hear the case (at worst), and therefore Justices should undertake recusals
with caution, erring on the side of participation rather than erring on the
side of recusal."' These concerns require closer examination.
Nine Justices serve on the United States Supreme Court."6 To hear a
case, a quorum of six Justices must be able to participate.'37 As Professor
Stempel has noted, "Seldom are at least two-thirds of the Justices not
available to decide a case before them.""' Accordingly, a full one-third of
the Supreme Court Justices could recuse themselves in each case without
preventing the Court from reviewing those cases. Indeed, although the
Supreme Court is the most visible of the federal appellate courts, it is not
the smallest. The smallest federal appellate court is the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which has six authorized
judgeships; six other circuits have twelve or fewer authorized
134. See id. (discussing the "rule of necessity" and referring to "all the Justices of this Court").
135. See Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837 (1972).
I think that the policy in favor of the "equal duty" [not to recuse] concept is even stronger
in the case of a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. There is no way of
substituting Justices of this Court as one judge may be substituted for another in the district
courts. There is no higher court of appeal which may review an equally divided decision of
this Court and thereby establish the law of our jurisdiction.
Id.; see Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1303 (20oo) (mem.) (Rehnquist, C. J.) ("[lit is
important to note the negative impact that the unnecessary disqualification of even one Justice may
have upon our Court.... [T]here is no way to replace a recused Justice. Not only is the Court deprived
of the participation of one of its nine Members, but the even number of those remaining creates a risk
of affirmance of a lower court decision by an equally divided court."); see also Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct.,
124 S. Ct. 1391, 1394 (2oo4) (mem.) (Scalia, J.) (noting that the recusal of a Supreme Court Justice
means that "[t]he Court proceeds with eight Justices, raising the possibility that, by reason of a tie
vote, it will find itself unable to resolve the significant legal issue presented by the case"); Statement of
Recusal Policy, supra note 126, at io69 ("In this Court, where the absence of one Justice cannot be
made up by another, needless recusal deprives litigants of the nine Justices to which they are entitled,
produces the possibility of an even division on the merits of the case, and has a distorting effect upon
the certiorari process, requiring the petitioner to obtain (under our current practice) four votes out of
eight instead of four out of nine.").
136. 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) ("The Supreme Court of the United States shall consist of a Chief Justice
of the United States and eight associate justices ....").
137. Id. (noting that the Supreme Court is comprised of nine Justices, "any six of whom shall
constitute a quorum").




In essence, the Supreme Court has used-and continues to use-a
variant of the "rule of necessity" and the "duty to sit" doctrines to create
a recusal standard for itself that is more limited and less stringent than
the standard set forth in section 455. The primary reason articulated for
subverting section 455's standard goes to the smaller size of the Supreme
Court-a justification somewhat unpersuasive in light of the
correspondingly small (or even smaller) sizes of seven of the thirteen
federal courts of appeals.'4" Moreover, a specific statute addresses those
relatively few situations in which a quorum of the Supreme Court is not
available.
Congress anticipated that situations would arise where the Supreme
Court would be unable to muster a quorum, and enacted section 2109 for
that purpose.' 4' Section 2109 provides two alternatives when the Supreme
Court lacks a quorum: if the case came to the Supreme Court by direct
appeal from a district court, the Chief Justice may send the case to the
applicable circuit court; in all other cases, if the majority of the Justices
do not believe that a quorum will become available in the next Term, the
Court must affirm the judgment, with the same effect as if the judgment
had been affirmed by an equally divided Court. 1
42
In most instances, by the time a case reaches the Supreme Court, at
least two, and sometimes three, other courts have evaluated the litigants'
challenges. In the federal system, typically the matter has been heard by
the federal district court and the federal court of appeals; in the state
139. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, UNDERSTANDING THE FEDERAL COURTS
(i999), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/UFC99.pdf, at 46 (last visited Feb. 15, 2005). The Seventh
and Eighth Circuits have eleven authorized judgeships; the Tenth, Eleventh, Federal, and District of
Columbia Circuits have twelve authorized judgeships; the Second Circuit has thirteen authorized
judgeships; the Third Circuit has fourteen authorized judgeships; the Fourth Circuit has fifteen
authorized judgeships; the Sixth Circuit has sixteen authorized judgeships; the Fifth Circuit has
seventeen authorized judgeships, and the Ninth Circuit has twenty-eight authorized judgeships. Id.
140. See id.
141. 28 U.S.C. § 2109.
142. In full, section 2109 provides:
If a case brought to the Supreme Court by direct appeal from a district court cannot be
heard and determined because of the absence of a quorum of qualified justices, the Chief
Justice of the United States may order it remitted to the court of appeals for the circuit
including the district in which the case arose, to be heard and determined by that court
either sitting en banc or specially constituted and composed of the three circuit judges
senior in commission who are able to sit, as such order may direct. The decision of such
court shall be final and conclusive. In the event of the disqualification or disability of one or
more of such circuit judges, such court shall be filled as provided in chapter 15 of this title.
In any other case brought to the Supreme Court for review, which cannot be heard and
determined because of the absence of a quorum of qualified justices, if a majority of the
qualified justices shall be of the opinion that the case cannot be heard and determined at
the next ensuing term, the court shall enter its order affirming the judgment of the court
from which the case was brought for review with the same effect as upon affirmance by an
equally divided court.
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system, typically the matter has been heard by the trial court, the
intermediate-level appellate court, and the state's supreme court. The
genuine need for a third (or fourth) judicial determination is rare. This is
particularly true in light of the fact that the Supreme Court has
repeatedly stated that its purpose is not merely to correct errors
committed by the lower courts.'43
The need for an additional judicial determination is also undermined
by the limited number of cases heard by the Court each year. The
Supreme Court's jurisdiction is largely discretionary, and the Court
accepts few cases.' The Court grants approximately one percent of the
petitions filed for certiorari-fewer than ioo cases each year.'45 Under the
so-called "rule of four," at least four Justices must vote to grant the
certiorari petition in a particular case for the Court to hear that case. '46
Accordingly, cases heard by the Supreme Court are largely a matter of
choice, left to the Justices' discretion. Given the fact that the Court
grants only about one percent of the requests for certiorari, litigants
cannot reasonably expect the Supreme Court to take any given case"-
the odds are stacked against a grant of certiorari, and the failure to
secure a grant of certiorari in a particular case simply cannot be deemed
unusual or disastrous when the same fate befalls ninety-nine percent of
the petitions filed.
All of that said, however, there remains a fly in the ointment. The
143. See, e.g., Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 275 (981) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Most certainly,
this Court does not sit primarily to correct what we perceive to be mistakes committed by other
tribunals.").
144. By way of comparison, 6o,847 cases were filed in the federal courts of appeals in 2003. See
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
judbus2oo3/front/caseload.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2005) [hereinafter JUDICIAL BUSINESS]. The federal
courts of appeals terminated 27,009 of these 6o,847 cases on the merits-meaning that the Supreme
Court reviewed approximately three-tenths of one percent (0.3%) of the decisions of the federal
courts of appeals. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbuS2003/tables/sI.pdf (last visited Feb. 17,
2005) [hereinafter STATISTICAL TABLES]. The filings of criminal and civil cases in the federal district
courts in 2003 totaled 323,604. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra.
145. See 2004 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2004year-endreport.pdf (last visited Feb. 17,
2005) (noting that 7,814 cases were filing during the 2003 Term, and that "9t cases were argued and 89
were disposed of in 73 signed opinions").
146. The "rule of four" is not mandated by statute; it is merely the Supreme Court's custom or
practice. See DAVID O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 246-47 (3d
ed. 1993) ("There is really no absolute rule that four votes are necessary when a full Court sits.
Certainly when there are only six justices sitting, it seems that three should be sufficient to justify a
hearing on the merits.") (quoting Letter from Reed, Douglas Papers, Box 228 (Frankfurter File), LC
(Oct. 12, 1940)); see also WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: How IT WAS, How IT IS 264
(1987) (explaining that the "rule of four" is a practice rather than a statutory mandate).
147. See Sup. Cr. R. 19(I); Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86
HARV. L. REV. 736, 749 (I973) [hereinafter Note, Disqualification] ("At least in cases arising on
certiorari, litigants have no absolute right to Supreme Court review.") (citing Sup. CT. R. t9(I)).
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United States Supreme Court is different. Although there are courts of
appeals with similarly few judges, the courts of appeals authorize district
court judges to sit by designation in the federal circuit courts, thereby
permitting judicial substitutions.' 8 No such procedure exists in the
Supreme Court; "there is no way to substitute a justice who has been
recused in the way that judges may be substituted on the lower courts."'49
All courts want justice done, but the conflict of values comes over
method; if disqualification of judges is too easy, both the cost and the
delay of justice go out of bounds. If disqualification is too hard, cases
may be decided quickly, but unfairly. Nowhere is that conflict of values
more glaring than in the United States Supreme Court, where the cases
are usually important. If a justice sits who should not, great interests
may be jeopardized; but if a justice disqualifies who should not, vital
questions may be needlessly left without authoritative decision. For
under existing law, there is no procedure for replacing a disqualified
justice of the Supreme Court even when his non-participation deprives
the litigants of the statutory quorum necessary for decision.'50
In addition, in the courts of appeals, judges hear cases in three-judge
panels,'"' and the members of those panels typically rotate. In the
Supreme Court, all cases are heard en banc. Thus, there is only one
United States Supreme Court; there is no procedure to substitute any of
the Court's nine members; and if the case cannot be heard by the Court,
there is no alternative court to consult.
Recusals at the Supreme Court level raise two other potential
consequences not encountered in other federal courts: (i) the loss of a
potential grant of certiorari, and (2) the increased possibility of
affirmances by an equally divided Court. The first of these potential
consequences has been dubbed "the certiorari conundrum.' ' .2 Professor
Lubet has noted that under some circumstances, a Justice's recusal
"actually may harm the very party that it was intended to protect." '
Professor Lubet provided a statistical explanation:
[A]ssume a o.i probability that any Justice will vote to grant certiorari
148. See Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, Diluting Justice on Appeal?: An Examination
of the Use of District Court Judges Sitting by Designation on the United States Courts of Appeals, 28 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 351, 358 (1995) (discussing the "sitting by designation" procedure and identifying
problems raised by the procedure).
149. Bleich & Klaus, supra note 40 , at 47. Indeed, the Constitution refers to vesting the judicial
power of the United States in "one supreme Court," raising the possibility that a constantly changing
Court, due to substituted Justices, might arguably be unconstitutional. See U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § I.
15o. John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 6o5, 608-09 (1947).
15i. Federal circuit courts of appeals must decide cases in panels of three, "at least a majority of
whom shall be judges of that court, unless such judges cannot sit because recused or disqualified," in
which case a judge from another appellate or district court may hear the case by designation. 28 U.S.C.
§ 46(b) (2000).
152. See Steven Lubet, Disqualification of Supreme Court Justices: The Certiorari Conundrum, 8o
MINN. L. REv. 657,658 (996).
153. Id. at 658.
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in any case, and that three already have decided to grant a certain
petition. If six Justices are yet to vote, the probability of granting
certiorari is .47. With only five remaining Justices, however, the
probability of review drops to .41, a difference of .o6. This relationship
remains constant, although the ratios change, for all probabilities less
than i.o. In fact, the absolute difference between probabilities for
certiorari with nine- and eight-Justice Courts increases for higher
probabilities. In other words, the more certworthy the case, the more
keenly the petitioner will feel the loss of [a Justice's] participation,
even if [the Justice] is actually biased against the petitioner....
[A]ssuming that [a Justice] is anything other than an outright hypocrite
or thief, her recusal in a meritorious case may decrease significantly the
petitioner's chances for certiorari. Indeed, even assuming that [a
Justice] is so biased that she is only half as likely to vote for certiorari
as are the other Justices, the availability of her biased vote nonetheless
increases the probability that the Court will grant the petition. During
the only period for which such statistics are available, between 23%
and 30% of all certiorari petitions granted attracted only the minimum
four positive votes. With no votes to spare in those cases, the
disqualification of a single Justice therefore could affect dramatically a
petitioner's access to review.'54
The second of these potential consequences-the increased
possibility of affirmances by an equally divided Court-is actually
perhaps of less consequence to the litigants than to those who did not
participate in the litigation.
The more serious interest threatened by affirmances by an equally
divided Court is that in having legal issues of general importance
decided with certainty. If only because the Court generally will not
write an opinion in such a case, the affirmance in effect makes no law
except with regard to the precise facts of the dispute at hand. It can be
freely disregarded even in closely analogous fact situations."'
Accordingly, much as commentators might agree that Justice Scalia
did not comply with the broad standard set forth in section 455(a) in the
Cheney case (and there is widespread consensus that he did not ),
154. Id. at 663-65.
155. Note, Disqualification, supra note 147, at 749.
156. See, e.g., FREEDMAN & SMrrI, supra note 2, § 9.1o, at 266 (stating that "Scalia's opinion denying
the recusal motion [in the Cheney case] engages in fallacious arguments and misstates and misapplies
the Federal Disqualification statute"); id. at 265 ("When the motion was made to recuse Scalia, '8 of
the In newspapers with the largest circulation in the United States... and 20 of the 30 largest have
called on Justice Scalia to step aside.' Moreover, 'not a single newspaper has argued against recusal."'
(quoting Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 124 S. Ct. 1391, 1399 (2004) (quoting Motion to Recuse 3-4 ))); see
also Monroe H. Freedman, Duck-Blind Justice: Justice Scalia's Memorandum in the Cheney Case, i8
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 229, 229 (2004) (describing Justice Scalia's recusal memorandum as
"disappointing and disingenuous"). Indeed, "[diozens of newspaper editorials have demanded that
Scalia remove himself from the Cheney case." Tony Mauro, Decoding High Court Recusals, LEGAL
TIMES, Mar. I, 2004, at I; see also Ries, supra note 28, at B4 ("Of course [Justice Scalia's] impartiality
in this case might reasonably be questioned. Of course his trip with Cheney might be viewed as
something more than a social contact. From my perspective as someone who has acted as a legal
arbiter between warring parties, Justice Scalia's arguments should be laughed out of court.").
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judicial recusal of Supreme Court Justices raises a number of interesting
issues, including potential constitutional issues.
B. SEPARATION OF POWERS
At least one commentator has proposed changes to-or additional-
ethical rules for Supreme Court Justices.
Congress should enact conflict-of-interest rules binding on the justices.
Today, the justices make up their own rules and they are often
inadequate, self-serving, and inconsistent. For example, Justice
Antonin Scalia has two sons who work in law firms that represented
the Republicans in the recent election case. The high court's rules
permit this so long as the firm deducts from the justice's children's
compensation the proportion of income directly attributable to
appearances before the Supreme Court. This formulation is naive in
the extreme, since firms that win before the high court reap enormous
indirect financial benefit in the form of new clients.'57
The reality, however, is that ethical provisions applying to the
Supreme Court already exist-most notably section 455. The refusal by
some Justices to follow section 455's statutory mandate suggests that
additional "rules" might similarly be ignored.
Moreover, a congressional statute attempting to mandate the recusal
of a Supreme Court Justice raises serious concerns. 58 In so acting, one
branch of government (the legislature) at least arguably seeks to act
beyond its own sphere of authority to proscribe an exercise of the
discretionary power of another branch of government (the judiciary),
thus raising a potential separation of powers issue.'59
157. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 28, at 181.
158. See Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 341 (20oo) ("The Constitution enumerates and separates
the powers of the three branches of Government in Articles I, II, and III, and it is this 'very structure'
of the Constitution that exemplifies the concept of separation of powers."); see also Clinton v. Jones,
520 U.S. 681, 699 (1997) ("The doctrine of separation of powers is concerned with the allocation of
official power among the three coequal branches of our Government. The Framers 'built into the
tripartite Federal Government... a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or
aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other."' (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
122 (1976) (per curiam))); Irving R. Kaufman, The Essence of Judicial Independence, 8o COLUM. L.
REV. 671, 700 (1980) ("Because of the unique position of the federal judiciary as the principal guardian
of the rights conferred by the Constitution, encroachments upon its protected sphere must be weighed
with acute sensitivity."). Indeed, guarding judicial independence is perhaps particularly important in
light of the judiciary's lack of power over either "the sword or the purse." See THE FEDERALIST No. 78,
at 465-67 (Alexander Hamilton) (Mentor ed., i961).
159. Separation of powers concerns involving ethical rules have been discussed in the context of
executive branch attorneys, specifically with regard to former Model Rule 3 .8(f), which from 199
° -
1995 regulated a prosecutor's ability to issue subpoenas to defense attorneys by requiring judicial
approval; Model Rule 4.2, which enjoins contact with represented persons; and Model Rule 8.4, which
enjoins lawyers from engaging in conduct involving fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and has been
applied to federal prosecutors conducting undercover operations. See, e.g., Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd.,
764 F. Supp. 328, 346-48 (E.D. Pa. i991) (holding that Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct
modeled after former Model Rule 3 .8(f) violated Supremacy Clause), affid, 975 F.2d 102, 103 (3d Cir.
1992); People v. Pautler, 35 P.3d 571, 582 (Colo. 2OO) (finding violation of Colorado rule modeled
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In amending section 455, Congress clearly undertook legislative
action aimed at governing the behavior of federal judges by requiring
that judges recuse themselves from cases under certain circumstances. To
some degree, section 455 embodies a constitutional principle; the
Supreme Court has long held that the avoidance of judicial bias is a
prerequisite to due process." However, not every situation involving an
allegation of judicial bias will rise to the level of a constitutional due
process violation-particularly when amended section 455 mandates
recusal not only when actual bias exists, but also when one might
reasonably question a judge's impartiality. Indeed, the Supreme Court
has observed that disqualification is a constitutional issue "only in the
most extreme of cases.'
6
1
Under some circumstances, the existence of a statutory command -a
law-might lead to a conclusion that there was no separation of powers
issue. Recall, however, that section 455 originally left the recusal decision
,6,in nearly all instances to the individual Justice's sole discretion 6 -
indeed, the original federal recusal statute did not purport to apply to
Supreme Court Justices at all.' 6' Accordingly, the vast majority of recusal
decisions formerly were within the judiciary's discretionary powers. At
least to some degree, it would appear that there is a potential argument
that recusal decisions constitute a discretionary judicial branch power in
those instances where constitutional due process is not implicated. 6 4 And
there is at least a potential argument that Congress acted beyond its own
upon Model Rule 8.4); In re Gotti, 8 P.3d 966, 978-80 (Or. 2000) (finding violation of Oregon rule
where lawyer misrepresented his identify, even though misrepresentation occurred in the context of an
undercover investigation). See generally Edward C. Carter III, Limits of Judicial Power: Does the
Constitution Bar the Application of Some Ethics Rules to Executive Branch Attorneys?, 27 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 295 (2003); see also Brenna K. DeVaney, The "No-Contact" Rule: Helping or Hurting Criminal
Defendants in Plea Negotiations?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 933, 935 (2001) (noting that "[tihe
application of Model Rule 4.2 to federal prosecutors has been steeped in controversy").
16o. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986) (finding that a particular judge's
participation in the case "violated appellant's due process rights"); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136
(1955) (concluding that under the Due Process Clause no judge "can be a judge in his own case [or be]
permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome"); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523
(927) ("[I]t certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment and deprives a defendant in a criminal case
of due process of law to subject his liberty or property to the judgment of a court, the judge of which
has a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case.").
161. Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 821.
162. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
163. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 note (2000) (stating that "[slection 24 of Title 28, U.S.C., 194o ed., applied
only to district judges" and that "[t]he revised section is made applicable to all justices and judges of
the United States").
164. See Frank, supra note 15o, at 612 ("In the Supreme Court disqualification has always been the
prerogative of each individual Justice .... From the beginning the practice seems to have been
founded upon a mixture of common law notions, individual judgments of propriety, and
practicability."); David Barnhizer, "On the Make": Campaign Funding and the Corrupting of the
American Judiciary, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 361, 368 (2001) (describing the ethical rules as "loose and
discretionary" in their application).
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sphere of authority in seeking to control the exercise of that discretionary
judicial branch power in amending section 455 . '65 A statute interfering
with a Justice's discretion to participate in a case suggests a different
constitutional perspective than adjustments to the Court's size, or a
broadening of the Court's jurisdiction, or even the evaluation of judicial
qualifications in the sense of the powers given to the President and
Congress in the appointments process. Adjustments to the Court's size
and jurisdiction arguably address more general-and more remote-
dimensions of the Court's functioning, in contrast to recusal standards,
which implicate the ability of a currently-sitting individual Justice to
participate in a case. 66
An additional factor within the separation of powers discussion is
the Court's political nature. There is no merit-based selection process for
Supreme Court Justices; Justices are selected through a- highly politicized
process."6 Nominated by the President, Supreme Court Justices are not
165. In the context of reviewing the financial disclosure requirement of the Ethics in Government
Act against a separation of powers challenge, the Fifth Circuit upheld the validity of the Act, but
acknowledged that the Act's provisions constituted an "intrusion upon the constitutionally assigned
functions of the judiciary." Duplantier v. United States, 6o6 F.2d 654, 668 (5 th Cir. '979).
166. Professor Stempel, however, has argued that there is no constitutional violation:
The proposed Supreme Court review of recusal denials would not run counter to the
Constitutional scheme if it were adopted by Supreme Court Rule. If adopted by statute, the
procedure should face no greater skepticism. By enacting the proposed section 45 5 (f),
Congress would be merely exercising its conceded power to regulate the Court in limited,
nonpartisan means not related to the desired result in a given case.
Stempel, supra note 28, at 658; see also Note, Disqualification, supra note 147, at 742-43 n.29
(assuming, without analysis, that "the disqualification provisions of the ABA Code could of course still
become binding on the federal courts if Congress were to adopt them to replace the present § 455").
Professor Stempel observed that Congress "has altered the Court's size on seven occasions," and that
"Congress's authority to expand federal court jurisdiction, including the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, is accepted unquestionably." Stempel, supra note 28, at 659. The Fifth Circuit has
upheld the constitutionality of requiring federal judges to file annual financial statements. Duplantier,
6o6 F.2d at 673. Arguably, such financial statements also fall within a different analysis, especially
since the Ethics in Government Act, which implemented this requirement, applies to all three
branches of government. See Ethics in Government Act, § Iot(f), 5 U.S.C. app. 4 (2004).
167. See Debra Lyn Bassett, "I Lost at Trial-In the Court of Appeals!". The Expanding Power of
the Federal Appellate Courts to Reexamine Facts, 38 Hous. L. REV. 1129, 1182-83 (2ooi) (noting that
"the highly political nature of judicial appointments, and the corresponding political 'litmus test'
approach often employed in selecting judicial candidates, virtually ensures judicial biases and
prejudices of some sort"); Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 CAL. L. REV.
299,301 (2004).
We believe that the present Supreme Court selection system is so abysmal that even choice
by lottery might be more productive. We also believe that politics is primarily to blame. The
present level of partisan bickering has not only unduly delayed judicial appointments, it has
also undermined the public's confidence in the objectivity of those justices that are
ultimately selected.
Id.; see also id. at 305 ("The current selection criteria for the Supreme Court appear to be a set of
political litmus tests on matters such as abortion, the death penalty, and affirmative action."); Ifill,
supra note 26, at 61 l-12 ("[T]he public perception of judges and the judiciary as nonpolitical, neutral
decision-makers, has been deeply eroded during the past fifty years. Indeed, judicial decision-making
has increasingly come under fire for being 'activist,' 'partisan,' 'imperial,' or 'legislative.' ...
[Vol. 56:657
RECUSAL AND THE SUPREME COURT
selected for their neutrality.'8 Indeed, the Supremae Court is a political
body'6 chosen through political considerations. "[P]olitical
considerations were expected to be, and indeed have been, important
factors in the process of selecting federal judges.... [T]here has been a
long tradition of taking political factors into account in the nomination
and confirmation of Supreme Court Justices."'70 The men and women
sitting on the Supreme Court were selected precisely because they held
(or were believed to hold) particular views on particular issues.
If, indeed, "the judgments that the President and the Senate are
supposed to reach in the nomination and confirmation processes are
essentially political judgments-in both the highest and lowest senses of
that term,"''7' then Supreme Court Justices have, in fact, been selected
because they hold particular biases. Having appointed a particular
individual based on that person's ideology (and political connections)
renders recusal due to bias as to those ideological issues incongruent.
Most importantly, even if there is no separation of powers issue-
Nominations and confirmation hearings for federal court seats have become overtly hostile, political,
and racial."); Leubsdorf, supra note 3, at 269 (noting that although the Senate reviews appointees for
federal judgeships, "only Supreme Court appointments get much attention"). Justice Scalia's
memorandum opinion refusing to recuse himself in the Cheney energy task force case drew attention
to this politicized process. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 124 S. Ct. 1391, 1395 (2004) (mem.) (Scalia, J.)
(noting that "[m]any Justices have reached this Court precisely because they were friends of the
incumbent President or other senior officials-and from the earliest days down to modem times
Justices have had close personal relationships with the President and other officers of the Executive,"
and providing a number of examples).
168. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (conferring upon the President the power to appoint federal
judges with "the Advice and Consent of the Senate"); see also Saphire & Solimine, supra note 148, at
383-84 (noting that the Constitution "fails to offer guidelines for determining when or whether a
person proposed by the President or considered by the Senate is eligible to serve").
169. See Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 15 U. PA. L.
REv. 1639, 1644 (2003) ("[T]he Supreme Court is seen as more of a 'political' institution than are the
lower appellate courts.").
170. Saphire & Solimine, supra note 148, at 384; see id. at 385 (describing Supreme Court vacancies
as "major political events"); see also JOSEPH C. GOULDEN, THE BENCHWARMERS: THE PRIVATE WORLD
OF THE POWERFUL FEDERAL JUDGES 22 (1974) ("Lacking constitutional guidelines, the appointive
system has evolved through custom. And an essential element of our custom is that political
connections are as important to a prospective judge as is his legal ability."); Henry P. Monaghan, The
Confirmation Process: Law or Politics?, IOI HARv. L. REV. 1202, 1204 (1988) (describing the
confirmation process as political because the President "has selected an appointee satisfactory to
him-a judgment that may include the nominee's philosophy, as well as a wide range of factors not
associated with merit in a narrow sense, such as the appointee's contribution to the diversity of the
Court"). One commentator has observed that "a Supreme Court appointment is usually not simply a
parchment with a presidential autograph but represents an actual judgment in which a President really
participated." John P. Frank, Conflict of Interest and U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 18 AM. J. COMp. L.
744, 745 (Ig7o). Indeed, in earlier times, a Supreme Court appointee was "really and truly someone in
whom the President repose[d] trust and confidence," and thus "appointing Presidents frequently
look[ed] for advice to their appointees, because in many instances they were dependent upon those
same appointees for advice before the appointment." Id.
171. Lloyd N. Cutler, The Limits of Advice and Consent, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 876, 876 (i99o).
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and even if the Supreme Court willingly accepts section 455 as its recusal
guidepost-a practical problem remains. The standards within section
455 have the potential to be quite effective-if the Supreme Court would
follow them. Enforcement is, the problem, not a lack of potential
standards. What are the consequences when a Supreme Court Justice
disregards the statutory proscriptions? The Justice will not be subject to a
disciplinary hearing; the only real remedy would appear to be
impeachment.'7
In short, there are no simple answers. Enforcing ethical standards for
Supreme Court Justices is a problem without an easy solution. The
Supreme Court is a distinct and unique entity, imbued with a distinct and
unique constitutional and political stature. But the Supreme Court's
unusual posture also renders potential bias a particular concern.
"Generally speaking, where an appearance of bias-such that the judge's
impartiality 'might reasonably be questioned' by a reasonable person-
can be shown, any decision rendered by that judge will be subject to
reversal."'73 However, this remedy is not available when the judge having
an "appearance of bias" is a Supreme Court Justice. As the court of last
resort, no other court can reverse a decision of the United States
Supreme Court. Accordingly, when a Justice improperly participates in a
172. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 235 (1993).
In our constitutional system, impeachment was designed to be the only check on the
Judicial Branch by the Legislature. On the topic of judicial accountability, Hamilton wrote:
"The precautions for their responsibility are comprised in the article respecting
impeachments. They are liable to be impeached for mal-conduct (sic] by the house of
representatives, and tried by the senate, and if convicted, may be dismissed from office and
disqualified for holding any other. This is the only provision on the point, which is consistent
with the necessary independence of the judicial character, and is the only one which we find in
our own constitution in respect to our own judges."
Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 79, at 532-33 (J. Cooke ed., 1961)).
The problem is that, whether a justice is right or wrong, ultimately he or she is right by
definition. Once a justice decides that he or she is fit to hear a case, there is no process for
challenging that conclusion and it becomes the law-thus calling to mind Justice Jackson's
famous aphorism that a decision from the Court is final not because it is somehow infallible,
but rather it is infallible because it is final.
Bleich & Klaus, supra note 40, at 47.
There is today no effective mechanism for questioning the integrity of Supreme Court
justices. When a commission delicately recommended several years ago that "the Supreme
Court may wish to consider the adoption of policies and procedures for the filing and
disposition of complaints alleging misconduct against justices of the Supreme Court," there
was a resounding silence from the justices. To be sure, if any justice committed a federal
crime, he or she could be indicted or impeached, but short of the radical surgery of criminal
prosecution or congressional impeachment, there is no effective medicine that the body
politic could administer to a sick Supreme Court. Indeed, we even lack the tools necessary
to make the diagnosis, not only because of legal limitations, but also because of unwritten
laws and traditions that govern the manner by which we may challenge the integrity of the
justices. Every other judge in the United States is subject to some peer review or outside
review. For example, all lower court federal judges-on the district or appellate court-are
subject to investigation and sanctions administered by the Judicial Conference. The
Supreme Court is exempted from this procedure.
DERSHOWITZ, supra note 28, at 179-80.
173. FLAMM, supra note 5, § 5.5, at 154.
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decision, the taint can be removed only if a subsequent act of Congress
changes the result. Moreover, when the Court's decision involves a ruling
with respect to constitutionality, a tainted result cannot be undone by
any other court or branch of government. Thus, a tainted result in the
Supreme Court carries ramifications far beyond a tainted result by a
trial-level judge-yet under the current approach, it is the trial-level
judge, not the Supreme Court Justice, who is held to the more
demanding recusal standard.
Despite these concerns, the unique nature of the Supreme Court
cannot be ignored. A more demanding recusal standard is possible at the
lower federal court levels precisely because recourse is available-other
judges are available to be substituted. At the Supreme Court level,
however, precluding Justices from hearing cases for purely remote
precautionary reasons, and thereby silencing important voices in the
decision-making process, is impolitic, unwise, and counterproductive.
IV. MODIFYING THE SUPREME COURT'S APPROACH TO RECUSAL
At present, some Supreme Court Justices do not appear to follow
the full intent of section 455(a)'s broad recusal standard. The
rationalization for their approach appears to be based on several
interrelated factors, including a generalized reluctance to recuse, a
presumption in favor of participation, a belief that challenges to
impartiality are likely politically motivated, and a belief that because the
Supreme Court is "above the fray," recusals based on appearances of
partiality would be improperly overbroad. Although there is a risk that
some Justices do not take recusal sufficiently seriously, there is indeed
some validity to each of these factors.
A related concern involves the differences among the Justices with
respect to their approaches to recusal. Although this Article and recent
media accounts have focused on current Justices who, in a few instances,
have appeared to approach recusal in a somewhat cavalier manner, not
every Justice's name has been tied to public calls for recusal, nor has any
current Justice regularly refused to recuse such that his or her judgment
appears genuinely impaired and impeachment warranted.'74 Is it fair or
appropriate that the voices of some Justices are heard less frequently
because they are more cautious and therefore recuse themselves more
often? The reality is that we do notice when voices are missing from a
Supreme Court decision.
Difficult situations call for innovative solutions, and this situation is
no exception. It is tempting-but facile-to hold feet to the fire, insisting
174. For example, Justice Scalia recused himself from the controversial and highly-publicized
pledge of allegiance case. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 540 U.S. 945, 945 (20o3)
(mem.) (indicating that Justice Scalia did not participate in the case).
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that Supreme Court Justices must obey the federal recusal standard and
that consequences will follow. Too many issues lurk here, including some
of a constitutional dimension and some of a practical enforcement
nature. Accordingly, this Article takes a different tack.
This Article proposes that the Supreme Court shift its approach.
Currently, recusal motions are uncommon in the Supreme Court; indeed,
the Court appears to effectively discourage such motions. I75 This Article
proposes that the Court encourage recusal motions from parties
appearing before the Court. The disclosure requirements under federal
law and the ethical rules facilitate recusal motions.16 An increase in the
filing of recusal motions would increase the information available to the
Court and to the public, and might help to decrease the current sense of
personal insult that sometimes seems to be associated with such motions.
Moreover, Justices might become better sensitized to potential recusal
issues if litigants were to file recusal motions more regularly.
But this Article does not propose an increase in actual recusals.
Justices would, of course, be required to recuse themselves in those
situations where their participation would violate due process. Short of a
175. Similarly, after the widespread outcry over the duck hunting incident involving Justice Scalia
and Vice President Cheney, the Sierra Club eventually formally sought Justice Scalia's recusal. See
Gina Holland, Scalia Won't Step Aside from Cheney Legal Issue, LANSING ST. J., Mar. 19, 2004, at 5A.
However, such disqualification motions are unusual at the Supreme Court level.
[T]here are no clear procedures for litigators who seek to disqualify Supreme Court
Justices-a fairly remarkable fact given the complex set of rules and procedures that govern
practice before the Court.... In effect, a lawyer who questions the impartiality of a
Supreme Court Justice is given no direction on how to prepare a challenge to a Justice's
participation in the hearing of the case. The absence of specific procedures for filing recusal
motions to the Court implicitly discourages recusal motions by suggesting that they are
outside the realm of "regular" Supreme Court practice. It also reinforces the notion that the
Justices themselves, rather than litigants, are expected to take the lead in initiating recusal
practices.
Ifill, supra note 26, at 623-24.
The broad latitude afforded the Justices in making [recusal] determinations may be further
aided by the tradition of deference and politesse that characterizes Supreme Court practice.
Although recusal motions are filed against Justices on the Court, most litigants do not seek
disqualification-certainly not one based merely on the appearance of bias-because to do
so suggests a lack of confidence in a Justice's ability to evaluate the issues objectively. In the
rarified world of Supreme Court practice, such an action may constitute a breach of
protocol.... Perhaps for this reason, litigants sometimes appear to suggest indirectly that a
Justice's connection to a case creates the appearance of bias, rather than formally move to
disqualify the Justice from the case.
Id. at 622; see also Stempel, supra note 28, at 599 (noting that the "strong traditions of deference and
good manners prevailing in Supreme Court practice" may inhibit litigants from seeking to disqualify
Justices); Tony Mauro, Scalia Recusal Spurs Debate on Justices' Public Comments, THE RECORDER,
Oct. 20, 2003, at 3 (noting "long-standing, but unspoken, rules of etiquette that frown on asking
justices to recuse themselves"); Tony Mauro, Thomas Ruling Spurs Recusal Spat, LEGAL TIMES, Aug.
19 & 26, 5996 (quoting an attorney who declined to move for a Supreme Court Justice's recusal "for
strategic reasons" as explaining that "[y]ou risk offending not only the justice but the whole body").
176. See Ethics in Government Act, §§ 101-109,5 U.S.C. app. 4 (20o0) (requiring federal judges to
file annual personal financial statements); MODEL CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 3 E(I) cmt. (requiring
judges to disclose any information potentially relevant to disqualification).
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constitutional due process violation, recusal would remain where it
essentially is now -resting with the conscience of each individual Justice.
But, consistent with the Supreme Court's previous practice, this Article
suggests that the Court consider drafting a new Statement of Recusal
Policy (or expanding its current policy) to clarify a consistent-and
narrow-approach to recusal that would permit Justices to participate in
a case absent actual bias or an appearance of impropriety sufficient to
cast doubt on the integrity of the Court's decision.
Rather than recusing themselves in borderline cases, this Article
proposes that Justices instead submit "statements of interest." Such
"statements of interest" are recognized in comment 2 to Canon 3E(I),
which states, "A judge should disclose on the record information that the
judge believes the parties or their lawyers might consider relevant to the
question of disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no real
basis for disqualification.'" "Statements of interest" could be as lengthy
and formal as Justice Rehnquist's Microsoft memorandum explaining his
decision to participate in the case, x"8 or as brief and informal as a
paragraph stating that the Justice owns ten shares of a litigant's stock.
Either way, "statements of interest" would constitute a notable
departure from current practices. Under the Supreme Court's current
recusal practices, a Justice's decision not to participate in a case typically
is not explained, leaving Court-watchers to guess the reason for a
particular Justice's non-participation. "Supreme Court Justices are not
required to issue written decisions explaining decisions to withdraw from
hearing a case."' 79
"Statements of interest" would be part of the Court's record,
available to the parties and to the public, and would help to ensure
disclosure of potentially relevant information while permitting all of the
Justices to participate in the vast majority of cases. The institution of
"statements of interest" would avoid fear by the public of unknown,
unacknowledged relationships, interests, or biases that Justices might
have in a particular case, and would serve a policing function for the
Justices as well. By requiring the Justices to acknowledge openly any
relationships, interests, or biases in connection with a case, the practice
would serve to focus each Justice's attention on matters involving the
177. MODEL CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 3E(i) cmt. 2. Although distinctively different from a
case-specific statement of interest, federal law requires federal judges to file more generalized
personal financial statements annually. See Ethics in Government Act, §§ 101-109, 5 U.S.C. app. 4
(requiring federal judges to file annual personal financial statements).
178. See Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1301-03 (2000) (mem.) (Rehnquist, C.J.);
see also supra note 28 (discussing Justice Rehnquist's recusal decision in the Microsoft case).
179. Ifill, supra note 26, at 620 (quoting DAVID O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN PoLrncs 226 (3d ed. 1993)); see also id. (describing the Supreme Court's recusal practices as
"somewhat shrouded in mystery"); Mr. Rehnquist's Dilemma, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2000, at A26 ("For a
judge to reveal the thinking behind a recusal decision is all too rare.").
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potential for bias." Moreover, if Justices were consistently to
acknowledge all potential interests in the litigation before them, such
acknowledgements might invigorate public confidence in the Court,
while at the same time preserving the Court's critical function.
The notion that disclosures tend to deter conflicts of interest and
increase public confidence is well-established. Indeed, Congress
expressly relied on both of these reasons in enacting the original Ethics
in Government Act, which requires federal judges-as well as legislators
and executive branch employees-to file annual financial statements.
8 1
i8o. See Debra Lyn Bassett, When Reform Is Not Enough: Assuring More than Merely "Adequate"
Representation in Class Actions, 38 GA. L. REV. 927, 985 (2004) (observing that express
acknowledgements "increase[] the likelihood that the requested behavior will occur").
181. See S. REP. No. 95-170, at 21-22 (977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4237-38 (Senate
report setting forth the congressional objectives sought to be achieved by public disclosure).
(i) Public financial disclosure will increase public confidence in the government. Numerous
national polls of voter confidence in officials of the Federal government, and the low
turnout of voters in recent elections, were cited for the proposition that public confidence in
all three branches of the Federal government has been seriously eroded by the exposure,
principally in the course of the Watergate investigation, of corruption on the part of a few
high-level government officials. Public financial disclosure was seen as an important step to
take to help restore public confidence in the integrity of top government officials, and,
therefore, in the government as a whole.
(2) Public financial disclosure will demonstrate the high level of integrity of the vast
majority of government officials. Only a very small fraction of a percent of all government
officials have ever been charged with professional impropriety.
(3) Public financial disclosure will deter conflicts of interest from arising. Disclosure will not
tell an official what to do about outside interests; it will ensure that what he does will be
subject to public scrutiny.
(4) Public financial disclosure will deter some persons who should not be entering public
service from doing so. Individuals whose personal finances would not bear up to public
scrutiny, whether due to questionable sources of income or a lack of morality in business
practices, will very likely be discouraged from entering public office altogether, knowing in
advance that their sources of income and financial holdings will be available for public
review.
(5) Public financial disclosure will better enable the public to judge the performance of
public officials. By having access to financial disclosure statements, an interested citizen can
evaluate the official's performance of his public duties in light of the official's outside
financial interests.
Id.; see also Duplantier v. United States, 606 F.2d 654, 670 (5th Cir. 1979) ("Congress has set forth a
rather extensive list of values served by the financial disclosure provisions of the [Ethics in
Government] Act. Such values include increasing the public's confidence in the government and
deterring conflicts of interest.").
The first [public interest behind the adoption of the disclosure rules] is to assure the
impartiality and honesty of the state judiciary. The second is to instill confidence in the
public in the integrity and neutrality of their judges. The third is to inform the public of
economic interests of the judges which might present a conflict of interest.
In re Kading, 235 N.W.2d 409, 417-18 (Wis. 1975) (reviewing provisions in Wisconsin's judicial code
requiring financial disclosure).
Disclosure is similarly valued as a deterrent to corruptive influences in the area of political
contributions. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) ("[D]isclosure requirements deter actual
corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures
to the light of publicity.") (citing H.R. REP. No. 92-564, pt. 4 (197) and S. REP. No. 93-689, pt. 2
0974); see also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377,428-29 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(arguing that disclosure, rather than contribution limits, satisfies the government's interest in
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The openness associated with disclosures tends to generate positive
reactions even when there is disagreement with the result.I"2 Openly
acknowledging all interests that might suggest potential bias encourages
judicial reflection and introspection, which might also help to offset some
of the effects of unconscious bias.
This proposal recognizes that "a gap appears to have opened up
between recusal practices in the Supreme Court and recusal practices in
the courts of appeals and in the district courts."'" And this proposal
encourages a less-demanding recusal standard for Supreme Court
Justices than for other federal judges. But unlike other federal courts,
there are no "replacements" or "substitutes" for recused Supreme Court
Justices, and in the vast majority of circumstances, this Article suggests
that perhaps it is preferable to hear the voices of all nine Justices. If
Justice O'Connor holds a de minimis financial interest in a party, is it
genuinely preferable to exclude her voice from the proceedings? Or is it
acceptable-indeed more desirable-to have her participate in the case,
having submitted a "statement of interest" indicating her de minimis
financial holdings in the litigant? The ultimate recourse for blatant self-
interest or other substantial bias is the same under both this Article's
proposal and an insistence on strictly adhering to section 455-
impeachment. Short of impeachment, there remains public pressure
when a Justice appears oblivious to recusal-related concerns. But this
Article suggests that perhaps, in most instances, it is really in the
country's best interests to have all nine Justices participating in the
Court's cases rather than insisting on a strict recusal standard that would
prevent a Justice's participation for less than truly compelling reasons.'I
preventing corruption). As stated by Justice Brandeis in a different context, "Publicity is justly
commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman." Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY
92 (Augustus M. Kelly ed., 2d ed. 1932).
182. See Ifill, supra note 26, at 626 ("Chief Justice Rehnquist's decision not to recuse himself in
Microsoft drew criticism from some prominent legal ethics experts. His forthright disclosure of the
issue and direct and public statement explaining the rationale behind his decision not to recuse himself
drew praise from others."); see also Mr. Rehnquist's Dilemma, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2000, at A26 ("Mr.
Rehnquist's openness about the situation is praiseworthy."). Although not directly analogous, it is
nevertheless of some interest that in the arbitration context, potential conflicts of interest are
addressed solely through disclosure. See Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1046-47 (9 th Cir. 1994)
(noting that although "arbitrators have many more potential conflicts of interest than judges[, iun
arbitration,... only disclosure and not recusal is required").
183. Neumann, supra note 28, at 427 n.304.
184. See Leubsdorf, supra note 3, at 292.
[D]isqualification can play no more than a limited role. The way to get good decisions is to
enact good laws, to appoint good judges, and to provide effective access to courts, fair
procedures, and meaningful appellate review. Preventing a judge from hearing a case
because one fears she will decide it badly will always be a cumbersome procedure based




Recusal at the United States Supreme Court level raises serious and
largely unexplored issues. Although the federal recusal statute would
appear by its terms to apply to Supreme Court Justices, it is unclear
whether the statute potentially infringes on separation of powers. More
importantly, the federal recusal statute is essentially unenforceable with
respect to Supreme Court Justices; the only method of enforcement is
impeachment. These constitutional and enforcement issues, taken
together with the unique stature and eminently political nature of the
Court, suggest that an insistence that Supreme Court Justices are subject
to the broad standards of the federal recusal statute may border on being
simplistic. This Article's proposals are aimed at Supreme Court practices
and call for encouraging recusal motions, revising the Court's Statement
of Recusal Policy to clarify a consistent, narrow approach to recusal, and
the submission of "Statements of Interest" in borderline cases rather
than actual recusal. These proposals would encourage open
communication and full disclosure, while permitting all Justices to
participate in all but the most ethically sensitive cases.
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